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INTRODUCTION

When linguists and grammarians discuss tense, they

usually consider verbs and certain of their inflections.
When philosophers discuss tense, however, they are
apparently concerned with something else.

It is not al-

ways clear, exactly, what philosophers have in mind on

these occasions, though their concern seems to be with

larger linguistic units like sentences and statements.
Moreover, philosophers usually contrast the class of

tensed expressions with the class of tenseless expressions,
and this distinction is customarily held to support

additional distinctions of philosophical interest, concerning, for example, ontological commitments, conceptual
schemes, the passage of time, temporal becoming, and

perspicuous languages.
The philosopher's interest in tense thus appears

to extend beyond issues concerning the morphological

transformations of verbs in certain languages.

To

some extent, of course, the linguist is also interested

in more than the mechanics of inflecting verbs.

Some

work has been done, for example, on the propriety of
certain inflections over others in various situations.
1

For example, Huddleston:

[H2], Lakoff:

[LI].

the
But with respect to identifying tensed sentences,

1

2

typical view of the linguist is that sentences whose
verbs do not exhibit tense inflections

— that

is, verbs

which are not morphologically altered in specifiable
ways

— are

not tensed.

This claim is frequently advanced,

for example, with respect to Finnish sentences about
future states of affairs and to all sentences of

Chinese.

2

It is widely held that Finnish, for instance,

2See

Y. R. Chao, A Grammar of Spoken Chinese
Berkeley:
University of California Press ,~1968; M. Aaltio, Finnish
for Foreigners Helsinki, 1966; M. Lehtinen, Basic Course
in Finnish Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1965*
,

,

,

simply has no future tense, since sentences of the language

which appear to be about the future contain non-inflected
verbs.

This is not to be understood as the claim that

Finns cannot talk about the future.

It is simply the

claim that sentences used for that purpose are typically
not tensed.
The English language, by contrast, seems to be a

tensed language according to the linguist's criterion.
Most occurrences of verbs in the language are inflected
forms of some infinitive.

Thus the verb 'to drink'

rarely occurs simply as an infinitive, unless it belongs
to a verb phrase in which it is preceded by an inflected

verb.

When the verb 'to drink' is not part of such a

verb phrase

,

it usually occurs in one of its standard

tense inflections, like 'drinks', 'is drinking', 'drank

,

3

’has drunk’,

'will drink', etc.

What the philosopher has to say about tense, however,
is not nearly so easy to summarize

.

It is generally

acknowledged, though, that tenseless sentences may

contain what linguists would regard as tensed verbs.

For example, most philosophers who have concerned themselves with the tensed/tenseless distinction would regard
as tenseless sentences
(1) Red is a color

(2) All bachelors are unmarried

even though the infinitive 'to be' occurs in an inflected

form in each sentence.

These verbs are usually regarded

by philosophers as tenseless in such contexts.

Very

roughly, the idea here is that these verbs are deprived
of temporal significance or temporal import in these

contexts, and should be distinguished from morphemically

identical verbs not so deprived, such as the inflections
of 'to be' in
(3) John is drunk
(4-)

The guests are drunk

Since philosophers interested in tensed and tense-

less discourse represent a variety of views on the

nature of language

,

they quite naturally do not all

tenseless.
regard the same linguistic units as tensed or
or tenseless,
Even though many consider verbs to be tensed
concerning
there is little agreement (and discussion)

which larger kinds of linguistic units can have these
properties.

For some philosophers, sentences are said

to be tensed or tenseless, while others place the burden

on statements, propositions, assertions, or utterances.
To simplify matters, and also to avoid relying on

what many philosophers regard as questionable entities
namely, statements or propositions

—I

will restrict my

discussion to sentences, tensed and tenseless.

And

for ease of exposition I will understand the various
authors whose views
sentences.

I

examine as also discussing

In some respects, of course, there are

important differences between sentences and statements
or propositions, as the distinction is usually drawn.
But for the present purposes there are no important

differences, since the properties in virtue of which

statements or propositions are said to be tensed are

properties that we might also comfortably ascribe to
what I take to be sentences.

If I followed some

philosophers in taking a sentence to be nothing more
than a string of symbols which has neither sense nor
truth- value unless it is used in making a statement,

then there would, indeed, be some differences worth
mentioning.

But the linguistic units I want to call

tensed are more like sentence- tokens than sentence—
types .

5

Henceforth a sentence will be understood as being
an instance of a concatenation of morphemes whose visual
or sound pattern may be replicated on various occasions,

and to which logicians would assign truth-values (thus

ruling out words ) on those occasions.
It should be obvious, moreover, that what I am

calling a sentence is really only a declarative sentence.
But it is clear from the literature that philosophers

distinguishing tensed from tenseless sentences are

concerned only with declarative sentences.

Again, the

philosopher and linguist appear to part company, since
linguists would call interrogative s

,

for example, tensed,

3
so long as their verbs are inflected.

^Actually, there may be a perfectly good philosophical
sense in which some interrogatives are tensed. This
matter will be given some attention in Chapter IV.

For the philosopher, then, the investigation of

tensed language is more than an examination of surface
grammars.

Let us now consider some respects in which

the philosophical distinction between tensed and tense-

less discourse is held to be important.

6

CHAPTER

I

THE INSTABILITY OF TENSE
The Proposals to Revise Ordinary Language
The distinction between tensed and tenseless

sentences is pretty much a philosophical invention, and
not a matter about which we are likely to have strong

pre-analytic intuitions.

But it is not very difficult

to identify what seems to have seized the interest of
A survey

philosophers concerned with the distinction.
of the literature on the subject reveals that

since Aristotle

— philosophers

— at

least

have been impressed by

problems involving the temporal relativity of certain
kinds of sentences.

For example, the sentences

(5) John was drunk
(6) Mary is frowning

appear able to change in truth-value with time.
is true only after a time at which John is drunk.

(5)
.

But

at some time prior to John's first case of inebriation
it would be false.

(6), on the other hand, is true only

at those times at which Mary is frowning.

It would thus

appear that the truth— value of (6) could change quite
often.

If Mary frowns several times each day, (6)

would be true at those times but false whenever she is
not frowning.
the
Other sentences, however, seem unaffected by

7

vagaries of time.

In addition to analytic sentences like

(1) Red is a color
(2) All bachelors are unmarried

sentences from mathematics, like
(7) 2 plus 2 is

4-

(8) The sum of the interior angles of a
Euclidean triangle is 180 degrees

and sentences ordering events according to the earlier-

later relation

— for

example, sentences of the form

(9) E^ is earlier than (later than, simultaneous

with) E

2

appear to be true (or false) at every time if true (or
false) at some time.

Quite obviously, the truth or

falsity of (7) and (8)

— and

perhaps of most sentences

taken from axiomatizable theories
rest on temporal considerations.

— does

not seem to

It is easy to see,

therefore, why such sentences appear to have stable

truth- values , unlike (5)

(6).

The truth-value of

sentences like (9) would seem to be stable for a somewhat different reason.

If E

1

is related to E 2 in the

manner described by (9), and if these events are nonrecurrent (which we may henceforth assume all events
two
to be, unless stipulated otherwise), then these
loevents are so related regardless of our temporal

cation with respect to them.

If E^ precedes E 2 , this

are both
relation holds whether or not the two events

8

in our past, or both in our future, or whether they are

temporally separated by the present (i.e., if

E,

is in

our past and E^ is in our future).
Not all writers on the subject of tensed and tenseless sentences like to describe the difference between
(5)“(6) and (7 )— (9) as a difference concerning shifting

truth- values

,

since they prefer to regard sentences of

any kind as having stable truth- values (if they have truth
Zj.

values at all).

But the difference, however it is des-

:

2l

See, for example, Goodman:

[G13], Quine:

[Ql],

[Q2],

[Q3]

cribed, is widely held to be of considerable importance.
As we shall see

,

some philosophers regard having an

unstable truth-value as a unique property of tensed
sentences, and think, moreover, that tensed sentences

may be distinguished from tenseless sentences on this
basis, while other philosophers regard unstable truth-

values (or the appearance of truth-value instability)
as a symptom of a more subtle distinction between tensed

and tenseless sentences.

Many philosophers, in any case, regard ordinary
language as failing to provide a rigorous enough medium

for doing philosophy.

One of its alleged defects is

the (perhaps only apparent) instability of truth- values

Another related feature of

of its tensed sentences.

ordinary language

,

which

I

will discuss later in more

9

detail , is the imprecision with which we can successfully

communicate

— and

in particular, agree or disagree

using tensed sentences.

— by

The sorts of situations felt to

be disturbing may be suggested by the following brief

examples
Suppose that at one time you say ’John

then later I say ’John

cpd'.

cpd

*

and

If tensed sentences contain

some kind of implicit reference to the time of utterance,
as some philosophers have maintained, we seem to be

making different claims, thus ruling out any chance for
agreement short of simultaneous agreement.

If tensed

sentences do not contain a tacit time-reference, however, we might be able to make the same claim at dif-

ferent times, even though the sentences we utter have

different truth- values

,

as in the case where John had

not yet

cpd

when you said 'John

already

cpd

when

I

said 'John

cpd',

but where he had

cpd*.

From the above examples we can get a kind of
rough picture of what tensed discourse is supposed to
be.

Our intuitions are, of course, aided by our working

familiarity with such discourse, even though we do not
customarily mark it off from another style of language.
We are much less likely to comprehend initially

what a tenseless language is, although we can grasp
that on occasion we use sentences regarded as tenseless

10

by philosophers.

Many philosophers^ have advocated the

For example, Ayer: [A7], [A8], Duncan-Jones [D3],
Goodman: [G13], Russell: [R7], [R9], [RIO], Quine:
[Ql], [Q2], [Q33, Smart: [S10], [Sll], [S13], [S14].
:

use of a tenseless language

,

part of the purpose of which

would be to exhibit clearly and precisely the sense of
ordinary tensed sentences.

The reason for constructing

this revisionary tenseless language is that ordinary

language is confusing and complicated in a manner in-

appropriate for science, logic, or good philosophy.
Thus tensed language is abandoned in favor of a more

perspicuous and elegant
mode of expression.

— though

artificial

— tenseless

As Quine puts it,

Our ordinary language shows a tiresome bias
in its treatment of time.... This bias is itself
an inelegance, or breach of theoretical simplicity. .. .Hence in fashioning canonical notation it is usual to drop tense distinctions.
([Q2], p. 170)
In a similar vein, Smart writes
[Tenseless language] fits our ordinary way
of talking much more closely to our scientific
way of talking [than does tensed language] and
it avoids unnecessary mystification. ([Sll],
p. 140)

[Tensed language] causes us to see the universe very much from the perspective of our
position in space-time. Our view of the world
thus acquires a certain anthropocentricity
which can best be eliminated by passing to a
tenseless language ... [with which] we make
quite explicit the reference to our particular position in space-time. Once we recognise
this anthropocentric reference and bring it
out into the open we are less likely to Project it on to the universe. ([Sll], p. 142)

11

For all the similarity of motive enjoyed by those

philosophers advocating the translation of tensed discourse into a tenseless discourse, there is some dis-

agreement over the proper method of translation.

It

is not clear whether the various methods are incompati-

ble, but their results sometimes differ significantly,
as will be shown later on.

One of the most prominent views about the structure
of a suitable artificial tenseless language is that

tenses are replaced in it by tenseless verbs, token-

reflexive expressions, and the earlier-later relation.
...Such a sentence as 'he will run' can be
replaced by 'he runs at some future time' (with
tenseless runs ) and hence by 'he runs later
than this utterance'. Similarly, 'he runs'
means 'he runs (tenseless) simultaneous with
this utterance', and 'he ran' means 'he runs
(tenseless) earlier than this utterance'.
'

'

([Sll], p. 134)

'Randy ran' tells us not only who did what
but also when, i.e., prior to the period of
production of the sentence itself.
A verb in the present tense normally indicates a period within which the verb is
produced, while a verb in the future tense
normally indicates the period after its own
production. ([G13], P» 365)
...No statement is as such about the past.
It may describe an event which is earlier than
the occasion of its being expressed, and it
may itself refer to this temporal relationship. ([A7J, PP» 160-161)

Quine's variant of this view abandons token-

reflexives in favor of other temporal indicators.

12

'I will not do it again' becomes 'I do not
do it after now' , where 'do' is taken tenselessly and the future force of 'will' is
translated into a phrase 'after now', comparable to 'west of here'. ([Q2], p. 170)

And similar to Quine's view is that of Duncan-Jones
Instead of
(1) Brutus killed Caesar
we might say
(2) Brutus killed Caesar at T
in which the present tense is used in a timeless sense. But (2) is not an adequate rendering of (1) unless we explain the meaning
of 'T'.
The obvious way to do this is as
follows
(3) For some t, Brutus kills Caesar at t,
and t is before now
([D3], p. 22)

Moreover, nearly all these authors advocate the

replacement of tenses by dates.
The temporal position of the speaker,
relatively to the event described, which is
shown by this use of the present, past, or
future tense, could itself be characterized
by being explicitly assigned a date. ([A73,
p. 160)

...A certain 'ran' is translated by any
'runs [tenseless] on Jan. 7* 1948 at

noon E.S.T.
([6133, P. 569)

'

A physicist will not say... 'A meteor
visible now', but 'A meteor was visible
8h. 43m. G.M.T.', and in this statement
is intended to be without tense. ([R73,

is
at
'was'
p« 102)

...Any casual statement of inconsequential
fact can be filled out into an eternal sentence
by supplying names and dates and cancelling
Corresponding to 'It is
the tenses of verbs.
me ten dollars' we have
'You
owe
raining' and
the eternal sentence 'It rains in Boston, Mass.,
on July 15, 1968' and 'Bernard J. Ortcutt owes
W. V. Quine ten dollars on July 15, 1968',

13

where 'rains' and 'owes' are to be thought of
now as tenseless. ([Q3], p. 13)
I

have not yet explained what a tenseless verb is

supposed to be

,

although a few clues were provided in

the Introduction.

For the moment, however, let us grant

that the idea of a tenseless verb is intelligible., since

nothing as yet depends on the employment of this notion.
Moreover, the topic of tenseless verbs will later be

given a more detailed treatment.

Henceforth, whenever

it would be helpful to remind the reader that a certain

occurrence of a verb is supposed to be tenseless, the
verb will be bracketed.

In this way we can avoid con-

fusing tenseless occurrences of verbs with the tensed
verbs from which they are morphemically indistinguishable
Perhaps, then, the diversity of de-tensing tech-

niques can best be summarized as follows.

The tensed

sentences
(10) The glass was full

(11) The glass is full
(12) The glass will be full

would be translated into sentences having at least one
of the following two forms.

The first tenseless pattern

of analysis is explicitly endorsed in [D3] and less

obviously in [Q2], [S10], [Sll], and [S12].
(10') (Et)(t [is] earlier than
glass [is] full at t)

(11') (Et)(t [is] simultaneous with
the glass [is] full at t)

&

the

&

14

(12') (Et)(t [is] later than
glass [is] full at t)

-

the

&

In (10')-(12') the first conjunct in each expression

serves to locate the time of the event which is tense-

lessly said to occur then.

The blank in this conjunct

may be filled-in by the token-reflexive 'this utterance',
or by the phrase 'the time of this utterance', by 'now',

or by a date.

Or, the entire first conjunct may be

supplanted by a phrase of the form
.

't =

[date]

'

The second pattern of analysis is alluded to in

the other works cited, though some of the authors (e.g.,

Russell, Smart, Quine) seem to endorse both patterns,
or perhaps fail to discriminate between the two.
(10") The glass's being full [is] earlier

than
(11") The glass's being full [is] simultaneous

with
(12") The glass's being full [is] later than

Here, the blank gets filled-in as before.

Moreover, if

a date is used, any one of (10)-(12) may be expressed

by
( 13 )

The glass [is] full on (or at) [date

Although none of the authors discussed here deals

with the issue, it seems compatible with their various
positions, and intuitively plausible to boot, to say
that any sentence resisting translation according to
one of the patterns of analysis on the grounds that it

15

has no temporal significance or import, is tenseless
already.

Thus
(1) Red is a color
(7) 2 plus 2 is

4-

would not be re-expressed with the aid of such devices
as quantifying over times, or mentioning dates or par-

ticular occurrences (like utterances), since, roughly,
these temporal qualifications would either be super-

fluous and irrelevant, or simply too restrictive, since
the claims advanced by such sentences are not to be

understood as being true of particular stretches of
time, to the exclusion of other times (if they are to be

understood as being true of any times at all).
There may be, as we shall see shortly, some sen-

tences that resist translation according to these tenseless patterns of analysis, but in these cases it will

not be due to the irrelevance to these expressions of

temporal information in general, or to the restrictions
to certain periods of time placed on their truth-con-

ditions.

Let us call any sentence devoid of temporal

significance an atemporal sentence

.

The intuitively

plausible view, then, which these authors seem to endorse, is that all atemporal sentences are tenseless.
It should be mentioned that Russell

6

See [R7],

[R9].

seems to offer

16

an analysis of tensed sentences in terms of the logically

proper name 'this', which is supposed to denote a sensedatum experienced by the speaker.

All egocentric words,

he says, are definable in terras of 'this', and ’now'

means 'the time of this'.

Both Gale and Rosenberg^ seem

^See [G5] and [R6].
to think that this proposed analysis is a technique for

de-tensing language, and indeed, Russell's view seems
superficially similar to the token-reflexive analysis

explained above.

But Russell does not claim that

tensed sentences analyzed by 'this' are tenseless.
The language of the physicist, however,

_is

tenseless.

This language, Russell says, does without egocentric

words entirely, including 'this', and substitutes dates

for temporal indicators and latitude and longitude
O

coordinates for spatial indicators.
8

Russell's analysis

See [R7], pp. 102-109, and [R93, pp. 84-93.

of egocentric particulars is thus not germane to the

present discussion.
q
Many philosophers y acknowledge that some form of
[B4], Gale: [G2], [G3]» [G4-], [G5]»
[P33, [P93 , Rosenberg:
[G9], Geach: [Gil], Prior: [P2]
[R6] , Sellars: [S3J, [S4] , Strawson: [SI?]*

^For example, Broad:

,

one or both of the aforementioned tenseless patterns of

17

analysis is tenseless, but they do not hold that the

tenseless sentences analyze, translate, or otherwise
elucidate the tensed ones.

Usually, the issue here is

either that tensed discourse is more basic (in some sense)
than tenseless discourse, or that there is an asymmetry
of information between the two.

In the latter case,

tensed sentences are held to express everything expressable by tenseless sentences plus something else

—usually

the passage of time.

Geach defends the first point of view in the following way.

Predicates .. .in which dates are mentioned,
are a long way above the most fundamental level
of temporal discourse.
...It is definitely wrong to analyse an
unsophisticated simultaneity proposition, like
'Peter was writing a letter and (at the same
time) Jenny was practising the piano', in terms
of what happened at some one time t . . . .On the
contrary, telling the time depends on knowing
some of these primitive simultaneity propositions to be true.... A physicist may protest
that he simply cannot understand 'at the same
time' except via elaborate stipulations about
observing instruments; his protest may be dismissed out of hand, for he could not describe
the set-up of any apparatus except by certain
conditions' having to be fulfilled together ,
i.e., simultaneously, by the parts of the
apparatus. ([Gil], pp. 184-185)
The claim that tensed and tenseless discourse convey

different information has been supported as follows by
Gale

.Everything that can be said in a tenseless
language can be said in a tensed one , but not
• •

18

vice versa . E.G., if I tell you that Y is now
present and X is past, it would be pointlessly
redundant for you to ask me if X is (tenselessly) earlier thanY; whereas, if instead I had
told you that X is (tenselessly) earlier than
Y it would not be redundant for you to ask if
Y is now present. Similarly, if I tell you
yhat X and Y are now present I have ipso facto
told you that they are (tenselessly) simuT^
taneous, but if I tell you instead that they
are (tenselessly) simultaneous I have not
iP SQ i a cto informed you of their being present
now. TEGJT, p. 356)
The presumption in moves such as Gale's seems to be

that too much is lost in the shift to a tenseless dis-

course for it to be a valuable vehicle for communication.
Ib is often important to know , in other words

,

whether

events are past, present, or future.

Another popular dispute has arisen over the scope
of tenseless discourse.

Prior and Gale, for instance,

argue that some crucial tensed sentences are inexpressable in a tenseless language.

according to Prior,
10

See [P2]

,

One such sentence,

is

pp. 11-12.

(14) Eventually all speech will have come to

an end

This perfectly unobjectionable sentence, he says, is

equivalent according to Smart's toke-reflexive analysis
to the self-contradictory
(14*

)

The end of all utterance is earlier than
some utterance later than this one

Another un-detensable expression, according to

19

Prior 11 is the exclamation
,

J"L

See [P9], [PIO].
(15) Thank goodness that's over'.

Prior explains
...Not only is this [sentence ( 15 ) ].. .quite
clear without any date appended, but it says
something which is impossible that any use of
a tenseless copula with a date should convey.
It certainly doesn't mean the same as, e.g.,
'Thank goodness the date of the conclusion
of that thing is Friday, June 15 , 1954 ', even
if it be said then.
(Nor, for that matter,
does it mean 'Thank goodness the conclusion
of that thing is contemporaneous with this
utterance . Why should anyone thank goodness
for that?) ( [P9] p. 17 )
'

,

While these are interesting issues, they will be
at best touched on only briefly in this thesis.

Progress

in solving some of these standard puzzles has been re-

tarded by the absence of a clear distinction between
tensed and tenseless sentences.

In fact it will turn

out that what some philosophers have taken to be obvious

examples of tenseless sentences should instead be re-

garded as tensed.

I shall

devote the remainder of

this thesis, then, to finding an adequate distinction

between tensed and tenseless sentences.
Requirements for a Theory of Tensed Sentences
We should, by this time, have a rough idea of what

philosophers regard as tensed sentences.

Let me list,

20

then,

a.

few intuitions about tensed, sentences, which

not only seem quite plausible, but which we should

reasonably expect a satisfactory account of tensed
sentences to be compatible with.
1) Any sentence is either tensed or tenseless.

It seems reasonable to suppose that tensed and tenseless

sentences divide the language (or at least the class of

declarative sentences, which, strictly speaking, is
all we are concerned with for the moment) without residue.

Unlike the linguist and grammarian, the philosopher

identifies a tensed sentence on the basis of some
semantical feature or set of features, and, presumably,

either a sentence has this feature (or set of features)
and is tensed, or it does not have this feature (or set
of features) and is tenseless.

Naturally, there are

likely to be a variety of styles of tensed and tenseless
sentences.

We have already seen that philosophers

admit to a diversity of sentence-forms within the class
of tenseless sentences.

Not only are such sentences

as
(1) Red is a color

(2) All bachelors are unmarried

supposed to be tenseless, but so are sentences from
mathematics as well as the 'translations' of tensed
sentences formed according to one of the patterns of
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analysis described above.

Such a diversity, therefore,

is evidently not regarded as repugnant.

Writers on the subject of tensed and tenseless

sentences have not usually considered whether the two
classes of sentences exhaust the class of sentences.
This is not surprising, since for the most part, dis-

cussions of tensed and tenseless discourse have been woe-

fully cursory, especially given the importance attached
to some of the claims based on the distinction as it

has been made.

Nevertheless it seems prudent to suppose

that an adequate analysis of the tensed/tenseless

distinction is one according to which a sentence is
either tensed or tenseless.
2) Tensed sentences exhibit some kind of semantical

relativity or instability.

As far as I can see

,

every

writer on the subject agrees that tensed sentences,
unlike tenseless sentences, are semantically variable
in some way, although, as I have already suggested* the

source and nature of this variability has been explained
in a variety of ways.

For some, replicas of a tensed

sentence are said to be able to take different truthvalues;

for others, the extensions of predicates of

tensed sentences change from sentence-replica to
sentence-replica; and for others, no two replicas of
a tensed sentence, produced at different times, have
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"bh.e

same sense •

And "these

,

as we shall see

,

are not the

only accounts.
It would be expected, then, that an adeauate

account of tensed sentences would explain how replicas
of tensed sentences differ semantically from each other,

and that such an account could explain both the (at
least) apparent truth- value instability of tensed

sentences, and the problems concerning agreement and

disagreement sketched briefly in the previous section.
3) Sentences in grammatically perfect tenses are

(semantically) tensed.

Perfect tenses are, for example,

the future perfect ('John will have

fect ('John had

cpd'),

cpd'),

the past per-

and extended perfect tenses, like

'John will have been cping'

.

While we are not likely

ever to construe sentences with such complex tenses as
tenseless, confusions do arise over simple tenses.

There

are, for instance, certain uses of the grammatical future-

tense which may be tenseless (e.g., 'Add 2 and 2 and you

will get 4'), and Russell

^See

has used grammatically past-

[R7J, and the passage quoted from [R7] on p. 12.

tense verbs tenselessly.

More often still, the gramma-

tical present-tense is used for tenseless verbs.

Phi-

losophers usually call this tense the 'tenseless present'.
4) Some analytic sentences are tensed.

Given only

our rough grasp so far of tensed sentences, it seems
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plausible to suppose that there is a distinction

between
(2) All bachelors are unmarried

and
(16) Nobody will be (is now, has been) a

married bachelor

similar to that between
(17) (Et)(t [is] later than (simultaneous with,
earlier than)
& John [is] fat at t)

and
(18) John will be (is now, has been) fat

The relevant feature shared by the two pairs of sentences

seems to be that the first sentence in each pair is

tenseless, while the second sentence is tensed.

(16)

seems to stand to (2), in other words, as (18) stands
to (17).

With these four intuitions in mind, we are finally
in a position to examine in greater detail the most

prominent analyses of tensed and tenseless sentences.
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CHAPTER II
FREE REPEATABILITY

Introduction
It would appear that some philosophers have been
so impressed by the (perhaps only apparent) truth- value

instability of some tensed sentences, that they have
failed to probe very much further into the matter.

We

have seen that some replicas of a sentence like
(19) John was fat

can be true, if produced after John is fat, while other

replicas can be false, if produced earlier than either
John's birth or the onset of John's girth.

Such sen-

tences are said by some philosophers 15^ to be context15 See Gale: [G2], [G3], [G4], [G5], Goodman: [G13],
Massey: [M6], Rosenberg: [R6], Smart: [S10], Thalberg:
[T2]

dependent, while other sentences
are said to be freely repeatable

— tenseless
.

sentences

Thus, regardless of

when we utter such sentences as
(1) Red is a color

(9) E^

[is] earlier than (later than, simultaneous

with) E£
(20) (Et)(t [is] earlier than (later than, simultaneous with)
& John [ops] at t)

their truth- value (or sense, as some philosophers argue)
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is constant.

If such sentences are true (or false) or

have a certain sense at one time, they will true
(or false)
or have that sense whenever they happen to be
produced.
[A tenseless sentence] is freely repeatable
in a way in which a tensed sentence is not,
i.e.,.the truth- value of the statements formed
from its use at any time is invariant. (rG41.
p. 104)

An objectionable feature of [tensed sentences]
is that they are context dependent:
their truth
values depend on the times of their utterance.
([S10], p. 255)

Of some historical interest is the following passage
from a 1906 review of Hugh MacColl by Russell, 14 in

T4
x

Mind

,

1906, pp. 256-57.

which Russell observes not only the context-dependency
of tensed sentences, but also the need for a revisionary

tenseless language.
Ordinary language employs, for the sake of
convenience, many words whose meaning varies
with the context or with the time when they
are employed; thus statements using such words
must be supplemented by further data before
they become unambiguous ... .When we are told
'Mrs. Brown is not at home', we know the time
at which this is said, and therefore we know
what is meant. But in order to express
explicitly the whole of what is meant, it is
necessary to add the date, and then the statement is no longer 'variable' but always true
or always false.... It is essential that logic
should employ only forms of words which are
unambiguous, and when this is done 'variable'
statements disappear.
Let us call the view that tensed and tenseless

sentences may be distinguished in this way the 'free
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repeatability thesis'.

This view has taken several

interesting forms, each of which warrants investigation.
Before commencing with this project, however, it should

illuminating to examine what is perhaps the principal
impetus for at least one

— glaringly

of the free repatability thesis.
*

McTaggart

'

s

Curse

defective

— version

We may call this

'

McTaggart's Curse

McTaggart

ISy

thought that a distinction could be

-^See [Ml].

drawn between sentences making A-determinations
sentences expressing B-relations .

,

and

In the former

16

These are Gale's handy terms. McTaggart actually writes
only of positions on, or sentences expressing positions on,
the A or B-series.
class of sentences, something

— an

event, for McTaggart

is said to be past, present, or future.

In the latter

class of sentences, events are ordered according to the

relations earlier than, later than, or simultaneous with

.

A-sentences-— as members of the first class may be called

were thought to -'be context-dependent.

An event can truly

be said to be past only after it has occurred, present

only while it is occurring, and future only before it
occurs.

If, for example, we say of a past event that
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it is present (or future), the A-sentence we utter
will

te false •

But that A— sentence would, be true if we

uttered it while the event in question was present (or
future).

A B-sentence, on the other hand, once true

(or false) will always be true (or false).

earlier than

E'

,

If E is

we can assert their ordering no matter

what our temporal position is with respect to those
events .

17
'

Y7

There are some problems (largely epistemological) about
asserting B-relations between events at least one of which
has not yet occurred. But we may ignore these given the
scope of this discussion.
r

McTaggart did not address himself to problems

concerning tensed and tenseless sentences.
authors,

yg

18

Some modern

however, have been convinced that the class

For example, Gale, Rosenberg, Thalberg, on. cit .

of tensed sentences is identical with the class of

A-sentences, and that the class of tenseless sentences
is identical with the class of B-sentences, and, pre-

sumably, that these classes are disjoint.

Gale and

Rosenberg, for example, offer the following definitions.
A tenseless statement makes a temporal
designation by describing a B-relation between two events.... A tensed statement refers to the A-de termination of an event.
( [G2] , pp. 53-54)

[Tensed sentences] make what, following
McTaggart, we shall call A-determinations

—

28

determinations of the pastness, presentness,
or futurity of some event.... [A tenseless
sentence], while conveying some temporal
information. . .is neutral with respect to the
A-determinations of the two events which it
mentions. It makes, rather, what we shall
call a B-determination , locating two events
in the time series by means of the relational
qualities simult aneity being earlier than,
and being later than . ([R6j, pTT^BT)
,

,

This view is difficult to sustain, for a number
>

of reasons.

First of all, McTaggart’s A and B-sentences take

only event-expressions as arguments.

and tenseless sentences

understanding of them

— given

— do

not.

But both tensed

even our only rough
For example, consider

the tensed
(10) The glass was full
(6) Mary is frowning

(21) John will be fat

and the tenseless
(22) John [is] fat on [date]
(13) The glass [is] full on (or at)

[date]

none of whose singular terms are event-expressions.
Thus, if we are to take this extension of McTaggart's

view seriously, we should expect some account of how
the classes of A and B-sentences include sentences that
do not have event-expressions as arguments.

account has been offered by these authors.
19 See [S3].

No such

Sellars 19
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presents the most complete extant analysis of the

relationships between A and B-sentences and tensed and
tenseless sentences.

But he denies that the classes

can paired-off and identified in the way just mentioned.

What is needed from these other authors is clear
enough, however.

With respect just to tensed sentences,

they must explain how sentences of the forms
(23) S's cping

or S's being

cp)

is present

(24) S's cping (or S's being

cp)

is past

(23) S's cping (or S's being

cp)

is future

(

may be re-expressed as the tensed sentences
(23') S is cping (or is

cp)

(24') S was cping (or S

cpd)

(or was

(25') S will be cping (or S will
be cp)

cp)

cp)

(or will

What is needed, in other words, is an account of how

event-sentences can be re-expressed as thing-sentences
and conversely, how thing-sentences are re-expressable
as event-sentences.

There may be no insuperable diffi-

culties with this enterprise, but some sort of sophis-

ticated theory of events would seem to be required to
explain what events and kind of events are denoted in
the following (apparently tensed) sentences.
(26) John was old

[where does this event begin?]

(27) John hiccupped for the 10th time
kind of events recur?]

[what
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(28) John was a male

[is this an event at all?]

(29) John used to enjoy hiking
event at all?]

[is this an

What are perhaps more serious problems for the

view under consideration concern B-sentences and
tenseless sentences.

First of all, it seems that some tense-

less sentences simply have no event-language analogues.

Consider
(1) Red is a color
(2) All bachelors are unmarried
(7) 2 plus 2 is 4

none of which makes a B-de termination.

No events at all

are denoted in these sentences, much less two events

ordered according to the earlier-later relation.
Secondly, although
(30) S's cping [is] earlier than S's

(J>ing

might be re-expressed as
(30*) (Et)(Et')(S

&

[cps]

at t

&

S

[<ps]

at t'

t [is] earlier than t')

it is not clear what would be done about B-sentences

which appear to be tensed, for example,
(31) S’s cping was earlier than S’s (ping

Sentences like (31)

sire

ordinary enough, as in

(32) The breaking of the chandelier occurred
after the meal

(said while recounting the events of the previous night's

wild party).

Moreover many more examples can be found
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simply by "translating certain thing—
sentences into eventlanguage analogues, a practise which proponents
of the

view under consideration would have to condone.

For

example
(33) John will leave home after Mary returns
with the car

would become
(33') John's leaving home will be later than
Mary's returning with the car

These examples suggest that the class of B-sentences

cannot be identified with the class of tenseless sentences.

Even if put (31), for example, into the tenseless form
(31*) (Et)(Et')(S

&

[cps] at t
& S
[is] earlier than t'
&,

t

[axe] earlier than

[c|>s]

at t'

both t and t'

)

we are left with the problem that a sentence such as (31)
is both a B-sentence

,

in virtue of ordering events

according to the earlier-later relation, and apparently
tensed.

After all, (31) is true only at some times.

If I utter (31) before S

cps

and

<J>s,

the sentence is

false

Another problem with the view that the classes
of tensed and tenseless sentences are identical, re-

spectively, with the disjoint classes of A and B-sentences,
is the following.

McTaggart's A and B-sentences express

temporal relations only when the topology of time is

taken to be that of an open single line.

Tensed and
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tenseless sentences, however, can express a variety of
temporal topological relations.

McTaggart believed that— if time were real— it

would be represented topologically as follows,

where the arrow indicates the 'direction* of the future.
He did not think that the topology of time would be

represented in any of the following ways.
CL

b

>

(ii)
b
*

>

a.

(iii)

(iv)

1

CL

(v)

Such representations as the above have been proposed by
philosophers interested in problems concerning, for
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example, future contingency, foreknowledge, and
modal

and many-valued logics.^

20

How we represent time topo-

~

See, for example, Prior's discussion of topology in [P2]
en(^i n S time in [P31.
See also Grunbaum:
LGlpJ, LG16J, and van Fraassen: [VI].

logically depends, for example, on whether we take the
time series (if there is just one) to be dense, discrete,

linear, or whether we hold that there are possible futures

but no possible pasts, or both possible futures and
possible pasts, or neither possible futures nor possible
pasts.

A few examples should suffice to show how some

tensed or tenseless sentences are inexpressable in
McTaggart

'

s

A or B-language.

The branching lines in

(iv) and (v) represent possible futures for (v) and

possible futures or pasts, depending on one's temporal
location, in (iv).

In (ii) and (iii) we are to imagine

two independent time series.

And in (iii), the di-

rection of the future for one series is the direction
of the past for the other.

The theory of relativity

provides us with still further kinds of pictures.
the above selection will suffice.

But

The letters on the

lines are to be taken as standing for events, real

and possible.

However we might choose to describe the relations

between points b and

c_

in (iv) and b, £, and

d.

in (v),

it is clear that it will not be accomplished by an A

or B-sentence

,

since none of the relevant events is

past, present, future, or earlier than, later than, or

simultaneous with the other(s).

Thus, although we

might have ways of describing the relations between
these events, McTaggart would not.

It seems reasonable

to suppose, moreover, that however we would talk

about these events, our assertions would either be

tensed or tenseless.
51
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;

Cf., the first intuition concerning tensed sentences
in Chapter I, pp. 20-21.

McTaggart'

s

A and B-sentences also cannot adequately

express relations between events when time is taken as

topologically closed (e.g., circular).

This option

allows that world history might be finite but unbounded,

and must be taken seriously by philosophers and physicists
who admit numbers other than real numbers as values for
the time variable in physical equations.
22

For McTaggart,

See [Ml], p. 9.

and for a topologically open and linear time generally,
the earlier-later relation is asymmetrical.

But in

closed time this relation is symmetrical; for any two
points, a and b, on a circle, if a is before b, then
b is also before a.

Thus, although we can express
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relations between events in closed time, and although
we would presumably do so with tensed or tenseless

sentences, in most of the interesting cases we could

not use an A or B-sentence

Consider the following diagram.

NOW

As before, the arrow indicates the ’direction

future.
at t

’

•

Suppose, then, that John

cps

1

of the

at t and Mary

<|)s

From our temporal position at the point marked

’now’, the following conjunctions are true.
(34) John's cping at t [is] earlier than Mary's
& Mary's 4>ing at t' [is]
<J>ing at t'
earlier than John's cping at t_
(35) John's cping at t was earlier than Mary's
& Mary's 4>ing at t' is
(J)ing at t'
earlier than John's cping at t & John's
cping at t will be earlier than Mary's
<|)ing at t'

Although the earlier-later relation is used in (34) and
relation, and
(33), it is not McTaggart's earlier-later

hence (34) and (35) are not B-sentences.

If these were

McTaggart B— sentences, then the earlier— later relation

would be asymmetrical and the sentences would be false.
Moreover (35) would probably be unintelligible as a
B-sentence
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Furthermore, from our position at now , if we say
(truly)
(36) Relative to now, John's (ping at t is
past and John's cping at t_ is future

we are not using a McTaggart A-sentence, since although

McTaggart (in trying to establish the unreality of time)
claimed that an event E could be past, present and future,
he did not mean that E could have more than one of these
if

determinations relative to the same time.

2^

Thus (36),

25 See [Ml],
p. 21.

which can be true in closed time

,

and which is true given

the ordering of events pictured above

,

is not an A-sentence

since if it were, it would have to be false.
It appears, then, that as far as talk about temporal

facts is concerned, the view that the classes of tensed
and tenseless sentences are identical, respectively,

with the disjoint classes of A and B-sentences is false.
Gale and Rosenberg are clearly concerned with talk’

about temporal facts.

But it should be obvious that

if they want to offer an account of the distinction

between tensed and tenseless sentences, they must be
prepared to analyze the tenseless
(1) Red is a color
(2) All bachelors are unmarried
(7) 2 plus 2 is 4

none of which expresses a B-relation.

It thus appears
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that Gale and Rosenberg either
made a grave error in
failing to account for such
sentences, or that they
were only offering an account
of the difference between
tensed sentences and a sub-class
of the class of tenseless sentences-namely, those
that make temporal determinations. But as we have seen,
even this more modest
undertaking was unsuccessful.
Let us return, then, to a
consideration of the claim
that tensed sentences alone are
not freely repeatable.
Even if we cannot identify tensed
sentences with Asentences, is this claim satisfactory?

Problems with Free Repeatability
a. The two major formulations of
the

free repeatability thesis

We have considered the sense in which
A-sentences

are supposed to be context-dependent

— namely,

that if

an event is, say, past, then a true A-sentence
asserting
its pastness can be produced only after the event
has

occurred.

The situation is thought to be pretty much

the same with tensed sentences generally.

The sentence

(19) John was fat

can be true only at a time after a time at which John
is fat.

If John had never been fat, (19) would be

false
This view warrants further scrutiny.

It has been
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supported by philosophers of varying persuasions (e.g.,
Gale, Goodman, Smart), not all of whom have identified
the class of A-sentences with the class of tensed
sentences

Two major versions of the free repeatability thesis

may be distinguished

man and Gale.

— namely,

those championed by Good-

It is probably worth mentioning, inciden-

tally , that both these philosophers regard statements
and not sentences as being tensed and tenseless.
since what

call sentences do take truth-values and

I

have sense,

But

I

to their views

do not think that any violence is done

— for

these purposes at least

— by

the

formulations of them which follow.
Gale's view has been expressed in a variety of ways,

and adjusted to meet certain criticisms lodged by Rosenberg.

^In
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[R6]

Nevertheless, his position can be summed up
•

fairly as follows.

Converting his talk about statements

to talk about sentences, we can say that for Gale, a

sentence is not freely repeatable (i.e., is a tensed
sentence) if and only if its replicas can have truthvalues different from that of the original.
...A tensed statement makes a temporal
determination through the use of a sentence
which can be used only at a certain time(s)
so as to make a true statement. CLG4], p. 104)
It would seem to follow, then, that a sentence is
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freely repeatable if and only if it is necessary
that
every replica of the sentence has the same
truth-value
as that sentence.

Thus

(19) John was fat

may be true now, given John's girth.
false.

But it could be

That is, it would be false if asserted before

John put on his present weight.

Goodman takes quite a different approach.

He
V

claims that a sentence is freely repeatable if and only
if every replica of the sentence translates (or advances
the same claim as) that sentence.
. . .A
tensed statement has as constant a
truth value as a tenseless one; and a tenseless statement, no less than a tensed one,
is an event in time
The difference is that
tensed statements and other statements with
indicators are not, so to speak, 'freely
repeatable . . . .A term or statement is said
to be freely repeatable in a given discourse
if all its replicas therein are also translations of it.
([G13], p. 368)
.

'

A replica of the sentence
(19) John was fat

would not be a translation of the original occurrence
of the sentence.

A particular occurrence of (19) would

be more fully rendered as
(19') John [is] fat earlier than t

where t is the time of utterance of that occurrence of
(19)

•

And another instance of (19) would have the

sense of
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(19") John [is] fat earlier than t*

where

_t

is the time of utterance of the new replica.

Thus, for Goodman, tensed sentences do not change

truth-value.

— that is, that
phonemes — is a different

Every replica of (19)

particular string of symbols or

sentence, since the sense of each replica of (19) is

relativized to a different time.

However, every replica

of
(37) John [runs] on Nov. 5, 1971

translates every other replica.

Thus (37) is tenseless.

To be fair, it is not clear that either Goodman

or Gale offers the free repeatability thesis as pro-

viding an analysis of the distinction between tensed
and tenseless sentences.

Gale did offer some definitions

of tensed and tenseless sentences, and these were criti-

cized in the previous section.

Non-repeatability, on

the other hand, is held by Gale to be a criterion for
2S
a sentence being tensed. y

^See, for example,

But Gale also says that

[G2], p. 5^ and [G4], p. 104.

non-repeatability is what all A-sentences have in
common.

Consider the entire paragraph from which the

previous quotation from Gale was taken.
We must first distinguish a tensed statement
from one that makes a time determination in a
tenseless manner. There are, of course, countless grammatical techniques for tensing a
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statement , i.e . , for indicating that the
event
lked ^out is past, present or future.
?f
What all of these different 'usages' have
in
common, and what will serve as a* criterion
for
being a tensed statement is this: A tensed
statement makes a temporal determination
through the use of a sentence which can be
used only at_ a certain time (s so as to make
a true statement.
A tenseless statement
which makes a time determination is one which
describes a timeless relation of either
precedence or subsequence or simultaneity
between two events, without asserting that
either one is past, present or future; therefore , the sentence used in a tenseless statement is freely repeatable in a way in which
a tensed statement is not, i_.e_.
the truth,
value of the statements formed from its use
at any time is invariant. ( [G4]
p. 104)
,
.

Elsewhere, Gale makes the same point as follows.
• • .A
tensed statement refers to the Adetermination of an event. There are countless grammatical techniques for tensing a
statement of which tensed verbs are only one
but what they all have in common, and what
will serve as a criterion for calling something
a tensed statement, is this:
a tensed statement makes a temporal designation through the
utterance at some moment of time of a sentence
which cannot be used at every other moment of
time so as to make a true statement. The sentence employed in a tensed statement is contextbound, since it is not freely repeatable. The
reason for this is that a tensed statement
refers to the A-determination of an event, but
since this event changes in respect to its
A-determination the sentence employed in a
tensed statement cannot appropriately be used
at every moment of time. ([G2], p. 54)

Gale is clearly claiming in these passages that all the

various techniques for making A-determinations
the various varieties of tensed sentences

repeatability as a feature.

— that

— have

non-

is,
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Thus it might be that Gale offers
the free repeatability thesis as another version of
the account of tensed
sentences criticized in the previous
section-namely
that the classes of tensed and
tenseless sentences are
identical, respectively, with the disjoint
classes of
A and B-sentences. But if Gale does
regard the free

repeatability thesis as merely another version
of this
already-criticized account of tensed sentences,
he is

mistaken, since one can hold the free
repeatability
thesis without identifying tensed sentences with
A-

sentences and tenseless sentences with B-sentences.

Observe that, in the passage from [G4], Gale claims
;o

stinguishmg two classes of sentences that

b:

make time determinations.

This is clearly a vestige

of the view criticized earlier, and Gale can do with-

out it.

In fact he should do without it, since some

of the most transparently freely repeatable tenseless

sentences are those that, like
(1) Red is a color

(7) 2 plus 2 is 4

do not make B-de terminations

Moreover, as we shall see, it would also be a mistake to regard Gale's version of the free repeatability

thesis as an independent and alternative account of the

distinction between tensed and tenseless sentences
(rather than just A and B-sentences).

Not only is

4-3

non-repeatability not a necessary and sufficient
condition
for a sentence being tensed, but as our examination
of

Goodman will reveal, it may not even be a sufficient
condition.

Goodman's assessment of the free repeatability
thesis is also a matter for speculation.

The closest

he comes to an explicit definition of 'tensed sentence'

(or 'tensed statement

'

.

for Goodman) is the following.

...The difference is that tensed statements
and other statements with indicators are not,
so to speak, 'freely repeatable'.

(The context of this passage appeared earlier on p. 39).

What is puzzling about this is that Goodman appears
to be telling us the difference between tensed and tense-

less sentences while admitting that there are other

sentences (besides tensed sentences) with indicators.
And, of course, the suggestion is that these other

sentences with indicators are not tensed.

But then

free repeatability would not be the distinguishing

feature of tenseless sentences.

It is thus not clear

whether Goodman is offering an account of the distinction

between tensed and tenseless sentences, or whether he
is merely claiming that tensed sentences belong to

the class of indexical sentences.

If the latter, then

Goodman appears not to have offered an account of what
is special about that particular sub-class of the class

I
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of indexical sentences.

If the former, then Goodman has

offered an inadequate account of the tensed/tenseless
distinction, for the very reason that there are
tenseless sentences containing indexicals.
In spite of these difficulties in determining

the importance attached to the free repeatability
thesis,

the thesis is not totally implausible

,

and should be

examined whether or not Gale, Goodman, or anyone else
regards it as a satisfactory account of the distinction

between tensed and tenseless sentences.

Since apparent

truth-value instability and apparent change of sense
are two of the most prominent features of many tensed

sentences, some form of the free repeatability thesis
is likely to be entertained by any novice trying to

decide what a tensed sentence is.

It should therefore

be illuminating to see why the free repeatability

thesis is inadequate as an account of the distinction

between tensed and tenseless sentences.
For ease of exposition, then, let us henceforth
assume that Gale and Goodman are offering full-fledged

accounts of the distinction between tensed and tenseless
sentences.

This is not an outrageous assumption in

Gale's case, and is a real toss-up in Goodman's.
One last point should be made before beginning
the examination of the two major formulations of the

4-5

free repeatability thesis.

Certain remarks made by

Quine suggest that he might hold a Gale-type
version
of the thesis.

In [Q33, for example, he notes that cer-

tain sentences like 'You owe me ten dollars' may be
true
at some times and false at others, depending on
the cir-

cumstances of their production, and contrasts such
sentences with
...eternal sentences:
sentences that stay
forever true, or forever false, independently
of any special circumstances under which they
happen to be uttered or written. Under the
head of eternal sentences one thinks first
of the sentences of arithmetic, since time
and place are so conspicuously irrelevant to
the subject matter of arithmetic. One thinks
next of the lav/s of physics; for these, though
occupied with the material world in a way that
the laws of pure physics are nob, are meant
to hold for all times and places. The general
run of eternal sentences, however, are not
so august as their name and these examples
suggest. Any casual statement of inconsequential fact can be filled out into an eternal sentence by supplying names and dates
and cancelling the tenses of verbs. Corresponding to 'It is raining' and 'You owe me
ten dollars' we have the eternal sentence 'It
rains in Boston, Mass., on July 15, 1968' and
'Bernard J. Ortcutt owes W. V. Quine ten dollars
on July 15? 1968', where 'rains' and 'owes'
are to be thought of now as tenseless. ([Q3],
p. 13)

Although Quine uses the term 'eternal', it is not
obvious that he means by 'eternal' something other than
'tenseless'.

26

PP. 193-194-

In [Q2],

26

however, we are told that,
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while all eternal sentences are tenseless, not all

tenseless sentences are eternal.
tence

according to Quine

,

,

To de-tense a sen-

one has only to de-tense

the verbs in the sentence and add appropriate temporal

modifiers, like 'now', 'then', and 'at t*. 27

But to

Cf., the quotation from [Q2] on p. 12, and see [Q2],
*
’
pp. 170-173, 193-194.

eternalize a sentence, it is necessary to fill in all
the information implicitly provided in the sentence or

in the context of utterance.

This Job involves, among

other things, replacing the temporal modifiers with

detailed dates.

And since tenseless non-eternal sen-

tences tend to contain such temporal indicator words
as 'now' and 'then', we may suppose that Quine, like

Goodman, does not regard all tenseless sentences as

having invariant truth-values.
b

•

Gale

'

s

view

One initial problem with Gale's account is that
he never fully explains what a 'temporal determination'
is.

Presumably a sentence can make such a determination

even though it does not overtly contain a reference to
a time, since ordinary sentences like
(19) John was fat

are supposed to make temporal determinations.
It is also not clear whether Gale really intended
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to state his position as a modal thesis; nor is
it clear

that he saw the consequences of doing otherwise.

Con-

sider again part of the passage from [G4], quoted
earlier,
in which Gale discusses free repeatability.
. . .A
tensed statement makes a temporal
determination through the use of a sentence
which can be used only at a certain time(s)
so as to make a true statement.
A tenseless statement which makes a time determination is one which describes a timeless
relation of either precedence or subsequence
or simultaneity between two events, without
asserting that either one is past, present
or future; therefore, the sentence used in
a tenseless statement is freely repeatable
in a way in which a tensed sentence is not,
i.e .
the truth-value of the statements
formed from its use at any time is invariant.

One would have expected Gale to say that a freely re-

peatable sentence is such that the truth-value of the
statements formed from its use at any time must be invariant, since a non-freely repeatable sentence was said
to be a sentence which can make statements of different
po

truth- values
''

pg

In the beginning of the paragraph from [G2] part of
which was reproduced above (p. 41), Gale similarly presents a non-modal definition of a freely repeatable
sentence and a modal definition of a non-repeatable
sentence

Let us assume that this discrepancy is only an

oversight.

Gale, would not, in any case, have wanted

to say that a freely repeatable sentence is one whose

replicas have (rather than must have) the same truth-
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value

since

,

(38) The sun will rise tomorrow
(

39 ) Napoleon won the Battle of Waterloo

would have then been tenseless.
counter-intuitive.

This, surely, is

Gale's view requires more than de

facto repeatability.
Moreover, Gale's remarks on free repeatability invite another interpretation of his position.

On this

reading Gale still advances a modal thesis, but (38)
and (39) count as tenseless anyway.

I

have been under-

standing Gale as claiming that a sentence S is tensed
(non-repeatable) if and only if its replicas can have

different truth-values from that of the original.

But

we might take him to mean that S is tensed if and only

if it is not possible that all replicas of S have the
same truth- value.

The key phrases from Gale are as

follows
...[A tensed sentence] can be used only at
a certain time(s) so as to make a true statement]! CtG4j, p. 104)
...[A tensed sentence] cannot be used at
every other moment of time so as to make a
true statement. ([G2], p. 5*0

And let us ignore a later remark in the same paragraph
of [G2]

— namely,
...[A tensed sentence] cannot appropriately
(my italics) be used at every moment of time.

since, presumably, appropriateness of utterance depends
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on matters in addition to the tense of
sentences.

Even

the paradigm tenseless sentence
(7) 2 plus 2 is 4

cannot be used appropriately at every moment of
time.
In any case, on this new reading of Gale, a
sentence
S would be tenseless if and only if it is possible
that

all replicas of S have the same truth-value.

and

(

But then (38)

39 ) are tenseless.

Since this second modal formulation of Gale's view
is more obviously unacceptable than the first, let us

consider the first modal formulation to be what Gale was

driving at.

V/e

may therefore take Gale's view to be the

following.

Sentence S is tensed if and only if it is
possible that there are two different times
such that S is true at one time and false
at the other.

Sentence S is tenseless if and only if it
is necessary that there are no two different
times such that S is true at one time and
false at the other.

Although this seems to be the most plausible way
of stating Gale's version of the free repeatability thesis,
it also has difficulties.

The first of these is that

conjunctions of tensed with tenseless sentences will be
tensed, while some hybrid disjunctions will be tenseless.

That is,
(40) John was a bachelor

unmarried

&

bachelors [are]
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will be tensed, sincG it will be false prior to John's
birth, and true after his death.

But

(41) Jonn was a bachelor

or

unmarried

bachelors Care]

will be tenseless, since the second disjunct, and hence
the whole sentence, must be true whenever it is produced.

Hybrid disjunctions with false tenseless components, of
course, will be tensed, since the truth- value of the

whole disjunction will hinge on the truth- value of the

tensed component.

Thus the truth- value of

(42) John as a bachelor

or bachelors [are]

married
is false only when the first disjunct is false.

And

lastly, while hybrid conjunctions with true tenseless

conjuncts

— like

(40)

— are

tensed, hybrid conjunctions

with false tenseless components are always false and
hence tenseless.

Thus every replica of

(43) John was a bachelor

&

bachelors [are]

married
takes the value false, regardless of the truth-value of
the first conjunct.

Misgivings about this situation would probably be
due to a belief that, however we decide to classify com-

pound sentences with tensed and tenseless components,
we should not do so on the basis of the kind of connec-

tive in the sentences.

That is, (40)-(43) may be called
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all tensed, or all tenseless,
but they should fall within
the same catesory. This is not a
decisive objection to

Gale's version of the free repeatability
thesis.

But

it is a peculiarity we might want
to avoid.

Furthermore we provisionally decided
in Chapter
that a sentence is either tensed or
tenseless.

I

Thus,

if we wish to avoid the above results,
it would not help
to rule hybrids as neither tensed nor
tenseless. I should
think it would be preferable to abandon
this form of the

free repeatability thesis rather than make
this counter-

intuitive move.
We might, I suppose, decide that only simple
sen-

tences must be either tensed or tcnseless.

But it is

by no means imperative that we make this
concession.
Unlike the superficially similar and troublesome
dichotomies between normative and factual sentences
and ob-

servation and theoretical sentences, difficulties with

classifying tensed/tenseless hybrids are not inevitable.
On all three of the remaining accounts to be examined,
these hybrids come out quite plausibly as tensed.

Thus

we need not resign ourselves to encountering difficulties

in classifying hybrids, and perhaps excepting them from
the classification.

There are more serious problems with Gale's view,
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however.

Consider the following sentences.
(44) John was a married bachelor
(45) Nobody has squared the circle
(46) I do not exist

(47) John will have slept 8 hours before his
job interview

Each of these sentences counts as tenseless for Gale,
since replicas of these sentences must have the same

truth- value as that of the original.

(44) and (45) are

apparently necessarily false and true, respectively,
but they are also apparently tensed.

We saw in Chapter I

that it seemed implausible to rule out some analytic

sentences as tensed, and that
(16) Nobody will be (is now, has been) a

married bachelor
stands to
(2) All bachelors are unmarried

as
(18) John will be (is now, has been) fat

stands to
[is] later than (simultaneous with,
earlier than)
& John [is] fat at t)

(17) (Et)(t

Granted, sentences such as (44) and (45) are a bit unusual,

but that should in no way count against their being tensed.
Rosenberg,

29 In [R6]

,

29J

p. 148.

interestingly, observed that sentences
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which are necessarily true do
not appear to make A-determmations and for this reason he
ruled that
,

they are

not tensed.

But it seems that (44) and
(45) make A-determinations as much as do other tensed
sentences having thingexpressions as arguments. (44) and
(45) would have as
event-language analogues

(W)
(4-5

)

John's being a married bachelor
is past

Nobody's squaring the circle is past

just as
(48) John flunked the exam

has an analogue in
(48') John's flunking the exam is past

And of course even if (44) and (45) did not
make A-deter-

mmations

,

we have seen that this is not sufficient

grounds for ruling that they are not tensed.
The pragmatically paradoxical (46) is more than
a

bit unusual.

But, again, that is no reason for refusing

to consider it, especially since we would not
hesitate
to count
(49) I did not exist
(50) I will not exist

as tensed.
(4 7) is considerably less extraordinary than (44)-

(46).

But it, too, turns out to be tenseless on Gale's

view.

Clearly, if (47) is true (or false) at one time,

it must be true (or false) at all times, even
though the

temporal location of the event of John's sleeping with

respect to the time of utterance of
each successive replication.
wfo-d-Cih

(4-7)

changes with

There cannot be one time at

it will be the case that it was the case that John

sleeps 8 hours before his Job interview, and another time
at which it will be the case that it was the case that

John does not sleep 8 hours before his Job interview.

Against this, someone might argue that sentences
in the grammatical future perfect are rather strange,

pragmatically.

A sentence like

(4-7)

cannot be uttered

appropriately on as many occasions as a sentence in a
simple tense, like 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon'.

For

this reason (so the argument would proceed), it seems

pointless to talk about the truth-values of replicas of
sentences in the future perfect tense, since the contexts
in which such sentences can be uttered coherently are so

specialized that most of their replications are likely
to be nonsensical.

Although 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon',

if uttered indiscriminately, might occur as a non senuitur

in most contexts, it can nevertheless be understood out
of context.

(4-7),

on the other hand, cannot even be

understood unless it is uttered before John's interview
and is preceded by a remark like

rested for his Job interview'

'I

hope John will be well
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But all tensed sentences, it seems to me, are
in
the same boat pragmatically though of course
not

to the

,

same degree.

For example,

(51) John's analysis of the situation was

correct

makes no sense in a contekt in which we do not know what

John's analysis is.

Moreover, 'Caesar crossed the Rubi-

con' would be totally inappropriate

— if

when uttered prior to Caesar's birth.

not nonsensical—

But it is just

this kind of case that Gale's version of the free repeata-

bility thesis is supposed to cover.

At a time prior to

Caesar's birth, 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is false,

regardless of how appropriate an utterance it would have

been then.

Similarly, although it may be quite awkward

to utter sentences in the future perfect in most contexts,

what matters for the free repeatability thesis is the
truth- value of the sentence in those contexts.

It should

not be any easier to understand and determine the truthvalue of a past-tense sentence about an as yet non-existent

individual

— for

example,

(52) Nixon's great-grandson was an atheist

than an out-of-context sentence in the future perfect.
It would seem to be a grave defect in Gale's version

of the free repeatability thesis, then, that some sen-

tences in the future perfect tense would count as tense-
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less.

But not all perfect-tensed, sentences fail Gale’s

criterion.

For example,
(55) John will have slept 8 hours by the time
I get to Phoenix

can perhaps be true only at a time prior to my arrival
in Phoenix, since, if the word 'get' in the adverbial

clause can be used only before my arrival, the sentence

will be false after that time.

Furthermore, sentences

in the past perfect can change truth- value
cpd'

cannot be true before John

cps

,

.

'John had

though it will be true

afterwards

Another kind of sentence which appears tensed yet

which fails Gale's criterion we may call 'omnitemporal'.
An omnitemporal sentence is a disjunction consisting of
three tensed disjuncts, which differ only in that one is
in the present-tense, one is in the past-tense, and one
is in the future-tense.

Such a sentence might therefore

have the form
(54) S

cpd

or

S is cping

or

S will

(p

Alternatively, we might abbreviate this by prefixing the

present-tense component with the disjunctive tensed
operator,

'it is, was, or will be the case that...'.

Clearly, if an omnitemporal sentence S is true (or false)
at one time, it is true (or false) at all times.

What

suggests that at least some omnitemporal sentences are
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tensed, however, in addition to all
the components of
such sentences being tensed, is that
these sentences
exhibit a kind of semantical variability
characteristic
of tensed sentences and rather unlike
that of what we have
taken so far as paradigm tenseless sentences.
Although

omnitemporal sentences have stable truth- values

,

some

omnitemporal sentences are true at different times
in
virtue of the truth of different components.
Thus, prior
to S's first (ping, (54) is true because the
future-tense

component is true.

But after S's last

(ping,

because the past-tense component is true.

(

54 ) i s true

Thus, while

the truth- value of an omnitemporal sentence never
changes,

any omnitemporal sentence which does not report an
eternal
event or a perpetually recurring event is such that the

truth-values of its components change with time.
Consider, on the other hand, a tenseless disjunc-

tion of the form
[is] earlier than E^

(55)

earlier than

or

E

2

[is]

E-,
t>

If only the first disjunct (say) of (55) is true, (55)

will always be true in virtue of the truth of that com-

ponent.

Not only do paradigm tenseless disjunctions have

constant truth-values, but, unlike some omnitemporal
sentences, the truth-values of their components do not
change with time.
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What may yet be another difficulty with Gale’s

position is that he seems to take his version of the
free repeatability thesis to be equivalent to the view

that tensed sentences differ from tenseless sentences
in virtue of the rules controlling their use.^°
5 °See

[G4],

[G5].

Following his presentation of the free repeatability
thesis in [G4] (quoted above, p. 40), Gale writes,
The difference, then, between a tensed and
tenseless statement is found in a difference
in the rules controlling the use of the sentences employed in such statements. The...
'Rules for Tensed Assertion' state that the
present tensed sentence is used to describe
events virtually simultaneous with th e describing of them a he cast tensed sentence to' des cribe events earlier than the describing of
them and the future tensed sentence to describe events later than the describing of them.
;

;

TTgJTT, p.

1041

Perhaps this in itself is not an outlandish position.

But

Gale's rules are inadequate for any tensed sentence not
in the simple past, present, or future-tense.

For example,

Gale's rules do not cover cases in which the event des-

cribed (if any event is described at all) by a use of the
future perfect is prior to the time of utterance

,

may suppose it to be when uttering
(^6) John will have fought with his wife
before he arrives here

as we
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While this need not constitute an obvious defect in
the
free repeatability thesis, it is symptomatic of the

tendency among philosophers to overlook the complexity
of tensed discourse.
"

31

Mayo, Prior, fteichenbach, and Sellars are conspicuous
exceptions

c.

Goodman’s view

Goodman's discussion of free repeatability raises
still another nest of problems.

To recap briefly, Good-

man characterizes a freely repeatable expression as
follows
...A term or statement is said to be freely
repeatable in a given discourse if all its
replicas therein are also translations of it.
(CG133, P. 368)

And with certain qualifications already noted^ 2

^p.

,

I have

44.

suggested that we regard Goodman as identifying the classes
of freely repeatable and non-repeatable sentences with the

classes of tenseless and tensed sentences, respectively.
At first glance, it would seem that Goodman, in
the above passage, is providing a sufficient condition

for a sentence being freely repeatable, since his assertion has the form of a conditional.

Strictly speaking,

moreover, Goodman says that if all the replicas of an
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expression are translations of it, then that expression
is sa id to be freely repeatable.

But we are not inter-

ested here in the conditions under which a sentence is
said to be freely repeatable; we want to know under what

conditions a sentence is freely repeatable.

I have

been

assuming that Goodman is likewise not really interested
in public opinion concerning free repeatability, and

that he was obliquely offering a necessary and sufficient

condition for a sentence being freely repeatable (tenseless)

— namely,
Tl:

S is freelv repeatable (tenseless) if and
only if (x;(x is a replica of S => x
translates 3)

I will continue to assume that this is Goodman’s posi-

tion, although as I explained earlier,

^p.

^

even if it is

44.

not his view, it is of sufficient intrinsic interest to

warrant examination.
But Tl has a serious flaw

— namely,

that any sen-

tence which is never replicated counts as freely re-

peatable (tenseless).

Assuming that the conditional to

the right of 'if and only if' is a material conditional,

that conditional will be satisfied when the antecedent
is false

— that

is, when S has no replicas.

Thus any

tensed sentence would be freely repeatable as long as
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it is produced only once.

Moreover, even if Goodman

were offering only a sufficient condition for a sentence

being freely repeatable
T2:

— that

is, even if his view was

If (x)(x is a replica of S =3 x translates
S)
then S is freely repeatable (tenseless)

the problem would remain.
It is strange, in any case, that Goodman would

undertake to explain free repeat ability with a non-modal
thesis like Tl.
T3:

Let us therefore revise T1 to read
S is freely repeatable (tenseless) if
and only if it is necessary that (x)(x
is a replica of 3 => x translates S)
S is non-repeatable (tensed) if and only
if it is possible that (Ex)[x is a replica
of S & ~(x translates S)]

Does T3 provide a satisfactory account of the distinction

between tensed and tenseless sentences?
T3 at least avoids most of the difficulties troubling
Gale.

Hybrids like (40)-(43) would be tensed, since at

least one component changes its sense each time the
sentence is replicated.

Similarly, all of

(38) The sun will rise tomorrow
(39) Napoleon won the Battle of Waterloo

(44) John was a married bachelor
(43) Nobody has squared the circle
(46) I do not exist
(47) John will have slept 8 hours before
his job interview
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as well as omnitemporal sentences would
be tensed , since
the sense of the verbs changes with each
time of replication. That is, every replica of, say,
( 38 ) will indicate
a different time of utterance as long
as the replicas
,

do not occur simultaneously.

But T3 takes sentences with non-temporal
indicator

words as tensed, simply because it is not necessary
that

replicas of those sentences all translate each
other.

Consider
(

37 ) The barn [is] west of here

The verb, and indeed the whole sentence, is to be under-

stood as not having temporal import

— that

is

,

as not

ioself containing a reference to a time or having a trans-

lation containing a reference to a time.

’Here' is to

be given a Goodmanian interpretation, according to which
it names the region in which it lies.^4

^See

Thus 'here* has

[Gly], pp. 363-564.

no covert temporal reference.

Each replica of (57),

asserted from position P, translates every other replica
produced at P, regardless of the time of the replica's
production.

Even if the barn has been on a trailer which

moved between replications of (57), any replica of (57)
asserted from P would be a translation of any other replica
asserted from P.

The same claim would be made by those
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replicas as long as they are produced at P.

Moreover,

each replica would have the same truth-value (although
Goodman is not concerned with this), since given Goodman's

understanding of tenseless verbs, (37) would be true at
P if and only if at some time prior to, simultaneous
with, or later than the utterance of (37), the barn is

west of position P.

Nevertheless, two replicas of (37), produced from

different positions, do not translate each other, regardless of when they are produced.

Thus (57) is not

freely repeatable, and would be tensed according to T3.
But (57) seems to be tenseless, granting, perhaps,
the plausibiliry of the notion of tensed verbs.

informal tests fail for this sentence.

All our

Since it cannot

be translated by an expression which contains a reference
to time, or to an utterance or some other event, (57)

does not stand to a tenseless translation formed according
to one of the

tv/o

patterns of analysis as

(18) John will be (is now, has been) fat

stands to
(17) (Et)(t [is] later than (simultaneous with,
earlier than)
& John [is] fat at t)

Thus it would be tenseless according to the atemporality

criterion for tenselessness provided on p. 15 in Chapter I.
Nor does (57) stand to a contrasting sentence like

(58) The barn was (will be) west of here

as
(1C) The glass was full

stands to

(id

The glass is full

(12) The glass will be full

What stands to (58) in that way is not (57), but rather
the present-tense
(59) The barn is west of here

To be fair, this latter informal test is not con-

clusive

,

since there are some tensed sentences which

seem to fail it.

One such sentence is the (semantically)

future-tensed
(60) Next week I am speaking to the board of

trustees

which has a present-tense verb, and which would not be
distinguishable from its present-tense contrast on the
basis of the inflection of its verb.
(60) is an interesting kind of informal expression,

and warrants some examination.

problems here.

But it does not pose any

For one thing I suspect that we could

explain how such sentences contrast with other tensed
sentences and how tenseless sentences fail to contrast

with tensed sentences in this way.

It is probably sig-

nificant, for example, that in the absence of the adver-
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bial clause ’next week' and additional contextual information, we would not know that 'I am speaking to the

board of trustees' is in the future-tense, although we
would still know that it is tensed.
What is more important, though, is that (57) counts
as tenseless according to the criterion discussed in

Chapter I, that atemporal sentences are tenseless.

One

reason this is so important is that philosophers holding
radically different views about the nature of tensed
sentences all seem to agree to this criterion of tenselessness.

The reason tensed sentences are supposed to

be interesting in the first place is that they are all

temporally significant in seme way.

Thus the apparent

failure of the second informal test above is of little

consequence.

It should still be useful, though, as long

as we are not dealing with colloquialisms and other in-

formal uses of the language.

And clearly the expressions

of a revisionary tenseless language are anything but

colloquial or informal.
Once we see, then, that (57) is a decent counter-

example to our modalized Goodmanian thesis, T3, further

such examples are easy to produce.

temporal import or significance

,

Some might even have

such as

(61) The murder of John Doe on 1/9/75 [is]
spatially contiguous with here
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Since (61) is clearly not an expression of ordinary

English, the second of the two above informal tests

should apply.

Like (57)

,

(61) does not stand to con-

trasting tensed sentences like
(62) The murder of John Doe on 1/9/73 will
be (was) spatially contiguous with here
as (10) stands to (11) and (12).

What stands to (62)

in this way is the present-tense
(63) The murder of John Doe on 1/9/73 is
spatially contiguous with here

It is important to remember that although some

tensed sentences like (60) do not contrast in a certain
way with some other tensed sentences, (57) and (61) do
not contrast with any tensed sentences as (58) contrasts

with

(

59 ), or as (62) contrasts with (63).

Since (57)

and (61) are obviously not complex-tensed sentences,
like the future perfect, they would be in the past,

present or future-tense if they were in any tense at all.

Moreover if

(

57 ) and (61) were in one of these tenses,

then they would contrast, respectively, with one of (58)
and (59) or (62) and (63), as these sentences contrast

with each other.

But since

(

57 ) and (61) do not contrast

with any of these tensed sentences in this way, they are
not tensed.
I do not intend to specify here precisely how

tensed sentences like (58) and (59) contrast with each
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other, since I think it is sufficiently clear that
they
j-Q

contrast, and that their renderings

— like

(

57 )—

using tenseless verbs do not contrast with them in the
same way.
The significance of counter-examples like (61) is

that we cannot patch-up T 3 simply by stipulating that
the sentences being tested for free repeatability are
in some way temporally informative.

Thus (61) counts

equally against Gale, since it presumably makes a 'temporal determination'

(if any sentence does), and since

its replicas can have different truth-values

on the location of the utterer.

— depending

A person cannot be

at position F without being there at some time t.

Hence

if there is a P at which (61) could be false, there is

also a time t at which it could be false.

Someone sympathetic to T3 but unsympathetic to

Goodman's treatment of indexicals might try to circumvent the above difficulties by offering an account of

indexicals according to which the sense of all such

expressions is relativized to the time of their production.

That is, the indexical 'here', for example,

would be regarded as referring not just to the area in

which it lies, nor would

'I'

refer only to its producer.

Rather, indexicals would all refer
time of their production.

— in

addition

— to

the

We can take this to mean that
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'here', for example, either means something
like 'where
I am now'

or 'here-at-t' where

t
'

'

is the time of

utterance

On either of these readings,

(

57 ) and (61) would

be tensed, since replicas produced at different
times

would have different senses, even if they were produced at the same location.
But it is interesting to observe that, even though
(

57 ) and (61) are tensed on these readings of 'here',

it is not clear what tense they are in.

Reading

(

57 )

as

(57') The barn [is] west of where I am now
is more likely to be taken as a present-tense sentence

than
(57") The barn [is] west of here-at-t

since it is not very clear Just what

(

57

M
)

means, and

since it also does not appear to contain a reference
to the present.

present-tense.

But even (57') does not seem to be in the
Due to the tenseless verb in (57'), that

sentence is true if and only if at some time prior to,

simultaneous with, or later than the time of its production, the barn is west of where I am when I utter it.

By contrast, however, the present-tense
(59) The barn is west of here

is true if and only if the barn is

when I utter the
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sentence— west of where

I am when I utter the sentence.

We needn't dwell on these matters, however, since

even though an egocentric reading of indexicals may
lend
some plausibility to T3» there remains a very grave

problem with this thesis, and with Goodman's approach
to free repeatability in general, which vitiates any

attempt to analyze tensed sentences along Goodmanian
lines.

The problem is that no form of a Goodmanian

free repeatability thesis could be used to describe

English

.

It is doubtful

,

in fact , whether any ordinary

language would be properly described by such a view.
The difficulty is that, like a number of other

philosophers, Goodman appears to think that tensed sen-

— if not a genuine though perhaps
time — at least something very much

tences contain

tacit

reference to

like

this.

Thus he

55 [G12],

says^ that tensed sentences

'indicate*

p. 565.

when they are produced and when what they describe
happens

.

It is for this reason that replicas of a

tensed sentence uttered at different times are not

supposed to translate each other; each replica indicates
a different time of utterance.

This view seems to have the disastrous consequence
that the same claim cannot be made on different occasions
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by two tensed sentences.

If I say 'Caesar crossed the

Rubicon' and then later you say 'Caesar crossed the

Rubicon', we must be making different claims, since
the
sense of the verbs in our sentences are relativized to

different times.

Moreover if I say 'Socrates is sitting'

and then later you say 'Socrates was sitting' we must

again be making different claims, since each sentence
says something about or 'indicates' a different time of

utterance.

This, of course, does not square with the

brute facts of ordinary discourse.

We can make the

same claim at different times with tensed sentences.
I suppose one might take a skeptical view about

this and argue that although we may think that we can

make the same claim at different times with replicas
of a tensed sentence, an analysis of such sentences shows

this to be illusory.

It is not unusual for us to be

wrong about many 'facts' of ordinary life.
But this seems too high a price to pay for a

Goodmanian analysis of tensed sentences, or any analysis

according to which temporally separated replicas of a
tensed sentence have different senses or meanings

If

.

the instability of tensed sentences can be explained

only by denying that ordinary language is coherent, then
we should be more willing to accept that result.

nately we are not faced with that problem.

Fortu-

Later I
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®^-^-ll

oSfBT an account; of tensed sentences that adequately
1

explains their variability or instability, and which also
does not force us to take the above kind of skeptical

view of ordinary language.
Finally, the following curiosity is worth our

attention.

Consider again
(10) The glass was full

(10') (Et)(t [is] earlier than
glass [is] full at t)

&

the

(10") The glass's being full [is] earlier than

As I have already noted, (10') and (10") are thought

by some philosophers to provide tenseless translations
of (10), where the blank is replaced by, for example,

the token-reflexive 'this utterance', a date, or 'now'.

All I want to point out here is that, if tenseless

sentences are freely repeatable, in any of the senses
discussed, not all versions of (10') and (10") are tenseless.

Even in the absence of a theory of token-reflexives

and other indexicals and temporal indicators, we can see
that the expressions 'this utterance' and 'now' are such

that the sentences in which they occur are not freely repeatable.

Since these expressions have different refer-

ents each time they are produced, not all replicas of
(10*) and (10") translate (10), and it is possible that

some of these replicas have truth- values different from
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that of (10)

•

By substituting a date or time-coordinate

for the blank in (10') and (10 n ), however* these ex-

pressions seem to be freely repeatable.

Son of Free Repeatability
An interesting variant of a Gale-type analysis of

tensed sentences, in which emphasis is placed on the

relativity of truth-values of such sentences, is an
account suggested by Massey^.

Massey's presentation

56 In [M63.
is rather sketchy, but a fuller analysis would have ex-

In any case, we can get

ceeded the scope of his book.

a clear enough idea of his position to see that it is

false

Massey's intuition is that the relativity of truthvalues of tensed sentences is explained by the predicates

Massey calls these predicates 'tensed'

in such sentences.

predicates
...The extension of the predicate '0 is
when that predicate is taken as
a Cretan'
tenseless, is the set of all persons who are
now, have been, or will be Cretans. But if
0 is a Cretaken as tensed, the predicate
tan' has the set of all Cretans who are now
living as its present extension. Notice that
the extension of a tensed predicate is relative to time and may differ from one moment
to another. For example, Epimenides belonged
is a Cretan' in the
to the extension of
he obviously does
but
sixth century, B. C.,
,

'

'

0
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not belong to the extension which that
predicate has now. Clearly, therefore, the
reference of a tensed predicate is fully
specified only when its extension at every
moment is indicated. A tenseless predicate
may be thought of as a degenerate case of a
tensed predicate namely as a tensed predicate whose extension is the same at all
moments. ([M6], p. 404)
,

Massey goes on to remark that tensed sentences may
be constructed without using tensed predicates, and

using instead special Quantifiers which express present
existence rather than membership in a domain.

In such

a case it is not the extension of the predicates of

tensed sentences which changes with time.

Rather, the

domain of the quantifier(s) changes from moment to
moment.
Plato’,

Thus, if 'F' means '[is] a contemporary of
'

(Ex)Fx' is a sentence which is false now, since

none of Plato's contemporaries are currently living, but

which would have been true in Plato's time

Past and

7
37'The intricacies
of using such quantifiers are explored
in Cocchiarella: [G2], Prior: [PI], [P2]
[P3].
,

future-tensed quantified expressions would be regarded
as present-tense sentences prefixed by the appropriate

tense operator.
But Massey is not attempting here to describe

ordinary language.

Thus we should not construe this

last approach to constructing tensed sentences as a

formula for constructing all kinds of tensed sentences.

74

Clearly such an approach is applicable only to quantified expressions, and probably only to some of those.
Moreover, Massey (following Cocchiarella) combines

tensed predicates with temporal quantifiers in his tense
logic.

In fact, all the predicates in this logic are

tensed.

The interesting variant of the free repeatability

thesis which we may extract from Massey, then (whether
or not he actually endorses it), places the burden of

tense on predicates.

To avoid unnecessary complication,

let us attempt to analyze just grammatically simple

tensed sentences along these lines.

Suppose, therefore,

that we take this new version of the free repeatability
thesis to be the following.

A simply sentence S is

tensed if and only if its predicate is tensed (i.e.,
has an extension which is relative to time).

This view has some attractive features.

Our old

standby
(19) John was fat

counts as tensed, since the extension of
is relative to time.

'

was fat'

So, too, is

(39) Napoleon won the Battle of Waterloo

since the extension of

’

0

won the Battle of Waterloo'

changed from the time prior to the battle to the time
afterwards.

And not surprisingly

(38) The sun will rise tomorrow
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is tensed, since the extension of

'

(f)

will rise tomorrow’

(while admittedly ambiguous and scientifically
inaccurate)

did not include the sun before the creation of the solar
system.

Nor will it include the sun after its demise.

By extending this view to compound sentences
could classify hybrids.

we

,

A plausible way to do this would

be to say that a compound sentence S is tensed if and

only if one of its components is tensed.
(40) John was a bachelor

&

Thus

bachelors [are]

unmarried

would count as tensed, since the extension of the predicate of the left-hand conjunct can change with time.

This would explain, moreover, why replicas of (40) can
have different truth- values.
But let us consider only the version of the view
that applies to simple sentences.

On this view

(57) The barn [is] west of here
is tensed, on either a Goodmanian reading of ’here',

or one according to which ’here’ has temporal import.
In either case the extension of

'

(D

[is] west of here'

is relative to time, though somewhat indirectly.

position P, the extension of

*

©

At

[is] west of here'

is

the same at every moment, since the verb is tenseless,

and since

,

therefore , the extension of the predicate at

P is the class of things that were, are, or will be west
of P.

But if a replica of (57) is produced at P*

,

the
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predicate
extension.

'

©

[is] west of here' will have a different

And, of course, since any replica of (57)

produced at all must be produced at some time, and since
replicas of (57) can be produced at different places,
the extension of

time.

'

(j)

[is] west of here'

can change with

Thus we appear to be able to construct tensed

predicates with tenseless verbs.

In fact, since

'

©

[is]

west of here' is tensed even on the ascetic Goodmanian

reading of spatial indexicals, at emu oral predicates can
be tensed.

This last result (but not the former, as we shall
see later) seems suspicious.

While there might be predi-

cates whose extensions change with time, and while it

might prove valuable to study them, it is a mistake to

construe them all as bearers of tense.

One of the over-

riding vague intuitions about the subject of tensed
sentences is that such sentences

,

unlike tenseless

sentences, have some kind of temporal significance.

while it is true that for every position P at which

And
'

©

[is] west of here' has a certain extension, there is a

time t at which it also has this extension, and thus
while it is true that

'

©

[is] west of here'

can have

different extensions at different positions and times,
this does not seem to be sufficiently temporally significant.

After all, it seems equally temporally significant
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that sentences like
(1) Red is a color
(7) 2 plus 2 is 4

are true at all times and perhaps irrespective of time.

But the temporal significance of tensed expressions is

such that it would be revealed in a thorough analysis
of the semantics of those expressions.

The temporal

significance of (1), (7), and the predicate

'

®

[is]

west of here', however, would not be revealed in semantic analysis.

Rather than getting embroiled at this point in a

discussion of the temporal import of tensed expressions,
it would be preferable to reserve this for the next

chapter, since there are more palpable defects with the

view that tensed sentences are those that have tensed
predicates
The principal flaw with this view is simply that
some tensed sentences have predicates with non-temporally

relative extensions.

In particular we can find quite

a few examples of tensed sentences whose predicates

have the null class as an extension.

Two of these are

the already familiar
(44) John was a married bachelor
(45) Nobody has squared the circle

Clearly, the extensions of

1

©

was a married bachelor'
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and

'

(p

has squared the circle' cannot change with time,

since at no time can anyone be a married bachelor or
square the circle.

Thus the predicates in (44) and (45)

and hence the sentences themselves count as tenseless.
More interesting, especially for those who still
have qualms about taking analytic sentences as tensed,
is the result that some sentences in the grammatical

future perfect tense also turn out to be tenseless on
this view.

Consider, for example,
(64) Elephants will have become extinct by
the 22nd Century

Presumably the extension of

'

®

will have become extinct

by the 22nd Century' must be the same at all times.
the 20th Century, the extension of

*

(D

In

will have be-

come extinct by the 22nd Century' includes all things

already extinct and all due to become extinct by the
22nd Century.

Once into the 22nd Century, however,

membership in the extension of that predicate is, as
it were, closed .

Some animals may, of course, become

extinct in the 22nd Century, and thus belong to the

extension of, say,
23rd Century'

,

'

&>

will have become extinct by the

but once the 22nd Century is reached,

determining the extension of

'

CD

will have become extinct

by the 22nd Century' will be a matter of historical
research.
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Moreover, if the extension of the predicate
in
(64-)

could change

,

then it would be possible that at

some time elephants do not belong to the extension
of
'

®

wil1 have become extinct by the 22nd Century' and

at another time that they do belong to the extension
of

bbis predicate

with time

.

with time.

.

Thus the truth-value of

But the truth— value of

(64-)

(64-)

could change

cannot change

If elephants become extinct before the year

2100 A.D., then any replica of
will be true.

(64-)

produced at any time

And if elephants still exist after 2100

A.D., then a replica of

(64-)

will at any time be false.

Thus the predicate of (64) is tenseless, even though (64)
is tensed.
It appears, then, that we cannot distinguish tensed

from tenseless sentences along the lines suggested by
Massey.

Before presenting what

I

regard as a satisfactory

analysis of this distinction, however, it will be useful
to consider some issues concerning tenseless languages.

I

t
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CHAPTER III

THE TENSELESS PATTERNS OF ANALYSIS
Tensed and Tenseless Verbs
a. The Temporal Import of Tensed Verbs

It is widely held that tensed verbs are temporally

significant or that they have temporal import, although
the explanations for this alleged phenomenon differ con-

siderably in content.

With respect to the English

language alone, the claim many philosophers seem to be

making is that within the class of grammatically inflected
verbs we can distinguish two sub-classes

—namely,

the

class of tensed verbs (those that have temporal import)

and the class of tenseless -verbs (those that do not have

temporal import).

What is supposed to convince us of

this is that
(10) The glass was full

for example, tells us not only about a state of the glass,

but it also tells us when the glass was in this state
namely, prior to the time of utterance of (10).

It is

this temporal information which is to be eliminated in
a revisionary tenseless language by replacing tensed

verbs with tenseless verbs.

(10), with a tenseless

verb, does not indicate at what time or relative to what

time the glass is full.
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What is initially perplexing about this view
is
that in most cases we can identify a verb

.as

tensed or

tenseless only in the context of the sentence in which
it occurs, since tensed and tenseless verbs are
usually

morphemic ally indistinguishable.

But this seems to

suggest, not that verbs perform a temporal function or
have temporal import, but that sentences do.
If replicas of
(65) The book is heavy

can in some contexts be temporally informative and in
other contexts

,

such as

(66) (Et)(t is later than
heavy at t)

not be temporally informative

,

&

the book is

it is not clear why it

should be thought that the verb changes with the change
in context.

Moreover, since tensed and tenseless sen -

tences are often morphemically identical, it is not

clear to what extent even these larger linguistic units

perform a temporal function.

That is, it is not clear

why the string of symbols or phonemes, 'the book is
heavy'

,

should make less of a claim with respect to

temporal information in tenseless contexts such as (66)

than it would in casual conversation.

It seems at least

equally plausible that certain languages or contexts
impose temporal restrictions on the use of certain

strings of symbols or phonemes, and that (65), for
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example, may in some contexts only be used, truly
simul-

taneously with the book's being heavy, while in other
contexts, like (66), it may be used truly at any time,
if it can be used truly at some time.

And perhaps con-

trary to what is usually taken to be V/ittgenstinian
dogma, the different temporal restrictions on the truth-

conditions of morphemic ally identical sentences need
not indicate that these sentences differ semantically
in any other way.

Not only is there no good prima facie case for sup-

posing that tensed verbs perform some kind of temporally
informative role, but the respect in which these verbs
are temporally informative has not been explained in

any satisfactory way.

In general, the suggestion is

that tensed verbs have a kind of referential function.
It appears to be Quine's view, for example, that in

speaking a tensed language
dates

— need

,

certain information

— like

not be made explicit, since as much infor-

mation as is needed is clear in the context of utterance,
and tensed verbs somehow pick this information out.
.

was . . involves reference presumably
to some time or occasion implicit in the...
context. ([Ql])
. .

'

'

.

The above summary of Quine's view is unfortunately

rather conjectural, since all Quine says about the temporal function of tensed verbs is that they involve
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reference to times or occasions.

But given his views

about the merits of a tenseless language, and
his insistence on replacing tensed verbs with tenseless

verbs,

it is an inexcusable lapse that he did not
bother to

explain in more detail just what linguistic function
was
being exorcised in the switch to tenseless verbs.
It

is difficult to appreciate the extent to which tense-

less verbs are semantically pristine if we do not know,
what, precisely, is missing from them.
Quine is not the only philosopher to have offered
a perfunctory analysis of the temporal import of tensed

verbs.

Mayo claims that tensed verbs date the events

mentioned or described in the sentences in which they
occur.
• • .When. I
say that a man is walking or that
an apple ripened, I do much more than attach
the concept of a thing to the concept of an
event so as to form the more complex concept
of an event involving a thing, or of a thing
participating in an event. In addition to
doing this, I am also, in the first place,
asserting the actual occurrence of such an event
and, by implication, the actual existence of
the thing participating in it; and, in the
second place, I am dating the event in relation to the time of utterance of my sentence.
These three roles of the verb (conceptual,
assertive and temporal) correspond to the
philological distinctions: vocabulary (meaning),
mood (indicative), tense (present, past).
(CM43, p. 289)

And Goodman says only that verbs 'indicate' times.

3S Cf.,

p. 11 and

[G13], pp. 365ff.
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Notably absent from these
discussions is an explanation of how a verb can
refer to, indicate,
or date

anything when it contains no
conspicuous referring expressions. There might, of
course, be

some viable notion of covert or tacit
reference which would help
explain how expressions without
referring singular terms
can nevertheless refer.
But no such explanation has
been
offered by proponents of this
vague view of tensed
verbs.

Perhaps a more promising
approach would have been
to say that tensed verbs
connote times or occasions.
Interestingly, some such view
seems to have been popular
auong certain Medieval philosophers, 3?
who maintained
.

3T
CS6]t’[S73.

eXamPle ’ Buridan:

CB 5J.

that tensed verbs consipnify times.

William of Sherwood:

And these philosophers

very likely adopted the view from
Aristotle, who, in
Chapter 3 of De Interpretations, says
the following.
A verb is that which, in addition to
its
proper meaning, carries with it the
notion
oi time

...'is healthy’ is a verb; for besides
the
proper meaning it indicates the present
existence of the state in question,
...'he was healthy', 'he will be healthy',

verbs, but tenses of a verb; the
difference lies in the fact that the verb
indicates present time while the tenses of
the verb indicate those times which lie
outside the present, (trans. by E. M. Edghill)
.

In any case, the view that tensed verbs
connote
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times, or indicate times in some way other than by de-

noting them, may be what some philosophers are driving
at when they argue that tenseless verbs and temporal

coordinates analyze or explicate tensed verbs
that an expression of the form

explicates, say,

*

[<ps]

at t'

— that

is,

analyzes or

'<pd'

—

See, for example, Goodman:
CS11].

[Gl$], Russell:

[R7], Smart:

But, as before, it is not so obvious that tensed

verbs have a connotative function to warrant the omission of at least a moderately detailed account of what
this function is

,

especially if it is claimed that the

difference between tensed and tenseless verbs is that
the former have temporal connotations and the latter do
not, and if the absence of such connotations from tense-

less verbs is what renders these verbs uniquely appropriate
to certain kinds of discourse.

But while we can find

in the literature some discussion of the nature of the

difference between tensed and tenseless sentences

,

in

relation to the claim that these are distinct classes
of sentences, we cannot find any account of the nature

of the difference between tensed and tenseless verbs,

in relation to the claim that these classes of expressions are likewise distinct.

Perhaps one reason why philosophers have not fully
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elaborated the view that tensed verbs, unlike tenseless
verbs, have temporal connotations, is suggested by an

example offered by Mayo. ^

^In

Newspaper headlines, Mayo

[M4]

claims, typically discard the date-marking function of

verbs for the sake of vividness.

Thus the headline

(67) Jet fighter crashes
is not really a tensed sentence.

We presumably know

already that the event mentioned by (67) occurred in
the past; thus it would be superfluous to pack that in-

formation into the headline
not take a stand on this

,

.

And although Mayo does

it seems to be his view that

'crashes' in (67) is a kind of tenseless verb.

Whether or not we agree that (67) is a tenseless
sentence,

4-2

.

it is interesting to note that even though

52Newspaper headlines are
discussed in the next chapter.
'crashes' in (67) may be stripped of its date-marking

function, it is not clear that this verb has been

stripped of its temporal connotations (whatever, exactly,
these are).

Presumably an object cannot crash without

doing so at some time.

We thus know that the event

mentioned by (67) must occur at some time if it occurs
at all.

And this case may be contrasted with cases in-

volving sentences from mathematics.

In
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(7) 2 plus 2 is 4

the verb ’is’ has no such temporal connotations.

Al-

though sentences such as (7) may be said to be true at
t, in general, temporal information of any kind is

either superfluous to them or unduly restrictive.
Actually, as I shall show later, there are some contexts
in which sentences from mathematics are not atemporal

in this sense, but these may be ignored for the moment.
We want to contrast (67) to those sentences which are

atemporal
The moral of these last considerations, then, is

that it may not be very promising, after all, to argue
that tensed verbs have temporal connotations and that

tenseless verbs do not.

In particular it is not clear

how a verb like 'crashes' in (67)

>

or for that matter,

any occurrence of a form of the verb 'to crash', can
be stripped entirely of temporal connotations, since
an object cannot crash except at some time or other,

and every use of the verb presupposes this.

Having made these observations, we are now in a

position to consider in more detail the nature of tenseless verbs.
b. Atemporal and Omnitemporal Verbs

In spite of the absence of conventions concerning
the morphemic structure of tenseless verbs, semantically
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there is only one tenseless form of a verb.

A tense-

less 'is', in other words, is semantically equivalent
to a tenseless ’was'.

In English, philosophers often

indicate tenselessness with the so-called 'tenseless

present', a verb form morphemic ally but not semantically

identical to the present-tense.

^See

p.

And as noted before,

22.

at least one philosopher (Russell) has used a grammati-

cally past-tense verb as a semantically tenseless verb,

presumably for the sake of elegance.

Other philosophers,

to avoid confusion or the need to use brackets, italics,

or similar mnemonic devices, use artificial verb forms,

such as the archaic 'be' for the tenseless 'is'.

Whatever constitutes the temporal significance
of a tensed verb, a tenseless verb is supposed to be

devoid of it.

As one might expect, verbs which occur

in sentences from mathematics are usually offered as

paradigm cases of tenseless verbs.
...From 'Seven of them remained and seven
is an odd number' one unhesitatingly infers
'An odd number of them remained' , despite the
palpable fallacy of the analogous inference
from 'George married Mary and Mary is a widow'.
One feels the 'is' after 'seven' as timeless,
unlike the 'is' after 'Mary'. ([Q2], p. 170)

Typically, the semantics of verbs in sentences from

mathematics are not explained in any detail, even though
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"fcti

6

reader is expected to

und.6rst3.nd.

how verbs from non -

mathematical tenseless sentences are similarly atemporal
(or timeless).

Smart, for example, has written
...the tenseless 'present' which we get
in mathematics, as when we say that m is an
irrational number. When we say that tt is an
irrational number we do not mean that it is
now an irrational number. ([310], p. 226)

...Within scientific theory we of course
use "is" in a tenseless sense:
'the eclipse
of the moon is at t , when said earlier or
later than t, of course does not mean that
the eclipse of the moon is at that time at
t. ([S10], p. 256)
'

Smart's analysis of tenseless verbs goes no deeper
than this, even though

— like

Quine

— he

insists on the

merits of a revisionary tenseless language.

The sense

in which his treatment of tenseless verbs is typical is

that he tells us a way in which we are not to understand

tenseless verbs and sentences, but he does not tell us

which of various alternative readings is correct (if,
indeed, there are any).

What we are usually told is

merely that tenseless sentences do not indicate that the
44
are past, present, or
events they mention or describe
)i /i

Assuming, apparently, that events can be described or
mentioned in sentences whose referring expressions denote
things , cf., Chapter II, section 2.
future

— that

is, that we cannot infer, for example,
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'S is

now (was, will be)

Cf •
I

<p*

from 'S [is]

cp'

And , as

the quotation from Gale on pp. 17-18.

suggested earlier, it is not even clear that such

claims about sentences can be construed as claims about
the verbs in those sentences, as Smart seems to do in
the passages just quoted, and also in the following

passage
In what follows I shall want to make use
of tenseless verbs. I shall indicate tenselessness by putting these verbs in italics.
Tenseless verbs are familiar in logic and
mathematics. When we say that two plus two
equals four we do not mean that two plus two
equals four at the present moment. Nor do
we mean that two plus two always equalled
four in the past, equals four now, and will
always equal four in the future. This would
imply that two plus two will equal four at
midnight tonight, which has no clear sense.
(LS11), p. 135)

But even if we assume that it makes sense in the
first place to take verbs as either having or failing
to have temporal significance, it is not obvious, as
we saw at the end of the previous section, how some

verbs can be atemporally tenseless.

We can perhaps get

a rough intuitive idea of the sense in which the verbs

in
(1) Red is a color
(7) 2 plus 2 is

4-

for example, are supposed to have no temporal import,
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but the exigencies of constructing a revisionary tenseless language according to the first pattern of analysis
are such that verbs in other sorts of contexts must also

be considered tenseless.

But how can such verbs as

'crashes' in (67) or 'dines' in
(68) (Et)(t is earlier than
dines with Mary at t)

be tenseless?

&

John

If a tenseless verb is devoid of temporal

import, then it seems that these verbs are not tenseless, since if something is said to crash, or if two

people are said to dine, it is presupposed that these
events occur at some time or other.

It is thus not clear

how the verbs 'to crash' and 'to dine' can be as free
of temporal significance as the verbs in (1) and (7)
are supposed to be.
In a tenseless language constructed solely ac-

cording to the second pattern of analysis, in which the
only tenseless verb is 'is', there may be a similar

difficulty.

Ignoring the problem of translating sen-

tences of a thing-language into event-language sentences,

why must we suppose that the 'is' in
(69) John's dining v/ith Mary is earlier than

is as temporally insignificant as the 'is' in (1) and

(7)?

In (69) 'is' occurs in a verb phrase which ex-

presses a temporal relation.

And as long as we are
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allowing that it makes sense to say that verbs can have
temporal import, it seems more plausible to take the
'is'

in (69) as meaning something like

rather than

'

is-atemporally'

,

'

is-eternally

in which case it would

not seem to be temporally insignificant.

Since I think it is unnecessary to rely on some

account of tensed and tenseless verbs to explain the

distinction between tensed and tenseless sentences, I
do not intend to press this point about the second

pattern of analysis any further.

I merely want to note

that, granting the plausibility of saying that verbs

can have temporal import, there are no obvious compelling

reasons for supposing that the 'is' in (69) is semanti-

cally equivalent to the 'is' in (1) and (7).

Nor have

any compelling reasons been advanced in the literature.

Let us continue to consider, then, whether verbs

other than 'to be' can be stripped of their temporal
import.

In response to the above suggestions that verbs

such as 'to crash' and 'to dine' do not have atemporal
forms, one might argue that there are two kinds of

tenseless verbs.

First there is the class of atemporal

verbs, including such verbs as those in (1) and (7)«

And secondly there is the class of omnitemporal verbs,
including such verbs as 'dines' in (68).

The difference

is that while atemporal verbs are completely devoid of
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temporal import, omnitemporal verbs are, as it were,

merely temporally neutral.

If

*

9

*

is an atemporal

verb , then somehow temporal considerations are inappro-

priate both to its sense and to its use.
only does

'

9

*

not mean something like

*

That is, not

cp. . .

•

,

where the

blank is filled in by temporal information of some kind,
but

'cp'

cannot be used at the wrong time in the way in

which an instance of ’was' would be inappropriately used
to describe a future event.

But if

*

9

'

is an omni-

temporal verb, although it also cannot be used at the

wrong time (though, of course, like any predicate,
atemporal and omnitemporal verbs may be wrongly used in

other ways), it means

Sellars

W In

4-6

'

9a or 9 s or will 9 '.

draws a similar distinction.

Using his

[S3], pp. 533-534.

vivid terminology we could say that atemporal verbs are

perspective-free while omnitemporal verbs are perspectiveneutral , where the perspective, of course, is temporal.
...One can find a place for the ’tenseless
present' in the formulation of temporal statements without assimilating this tenseless
present to the tenseless present of mathematical statements. For it would obviously be
perfectly legitimate to introduce a use of
'is' in accordance with the schema
(19) x is 9 at t = Either x was cp at t or
x is 9 at t or x will be 9 at t
([S3], P- 533)

...Instead of construing tensed verbs as
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the enrichment of a neutral "stripped, down"
'perspective-free' mode of making temporal
assertions, the device of using 'perspectiveneutral' sentences to make temporal statements may rest on and presuppose the tensed
verbs of ordinary discourse. ([S3], pp. 533 -

What is interesting about distinguishing atemporal

from omnitemporal verbs is that

— as

Sellars suggests

verbs in the latter class are really tensed.

Certainly

the omnitemporal 'dines', for example, is not devoid

of temporal import.

But what is more important is that

it turns out to be an abbreviation for 'dined or dines

or will dine', where each of these verbs is, of course,

tensed.
The consequence of this

57 In [Sll],

pp,

objects to it

— which

is why Smart

A/7
*

I

137ff

— is

that omnitemporal verbs do not, after

all, avoid the philosophical and scientific pitfalls of

ordinary tensed discourse.

Most, if not all, of the

important semantic deficiencies are retained.

.

The ornni-

temporal 'dines' is as temporally biased (as Quine might
say) or anthropocentric (as Smart would say)

as the

Cf., the passages from Quine and Smart on p. 10.

tensed verbs whose disjunction it abbreviates, since it
gets its sense from just those expressions responsible
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for that bias or anthropocentricity.

Omnitemporal verbs

are therefore inappropriate for Quine and Smart’s rigo-

rous tenseless language.

And since it is not clear how

verbs such as ’dines' in (68) can be totally stripped
of their temporal significance like the verbs in (1)

and (7), it might be that the sort of full-fledged

tenseless language envisioned by these authors could

never get off the ground.
We should note, further, that not all verbs can
be read omnitemporally , since, semantically

,

not all

verbs have past, present, and future-tense forms.

Con-

sider, for example, an achievement verb like 'to win'.
The past and future-tense forms of the verb can be used

to report and predict, respectively, past and future

victories; we can say 'John won the race' or 'John will

win the race'.

But the present-tense 'John is winning

the race' does not report a victory of John's.

Rather

it says that John is currently in the lead.

We may contrast the verb 'to win' with the verb
'to smile'.

When we say 'John smiled', 'John is smiling',

or 'John will smile', we are in each case attributing
a smile to John.

But we do not ascribe a victory to

John when we say 'John is winning the race', whereas
we do report or predict that John is victorious when we

say 'John won the race' or 'John will win the race'.
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Moreover, if we cannot ascribe victories to John in the

present-tense of 'to win', then the following schema
(70) (Et)(t is simultaneous with
wins at t)

&

John

constructed according to the first pattern of analysis,
cannot be used to express'
( 71 )

since

( 70 )

John is winning

reports a victory and

( 71 )

does not.

Attempts to explain the sense in which certain
(apparently non-atemporal) verbs are tenseless by saying
that they are omnitemporal is therefore doomed for two

reasons.

The first is that omnitemporal verbs, when they

can be formed at all, are really tensed, and secondly,
a large number of verbs, which cannot be construed as

having atemporal forms, do not have omnitemporal forms
either.

Moreover, if certain verbs cannot have an atemporal
form, it does not help to say as Smart

^In

does, that the

[Sll], pp. 138-139.

copula in both
( 72 )

x is

(p

at t

(73) 7 is a prime number

is tenseless (atemporal) but that the predicates differ,

the former being appropriate to denizens of space-time

and not to objects of mathematics.

Thus, for Smart,
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sentences about spatio-temporal objects can be tenseless

in the same sense as sentences about eternal objects.
But the problem with this is that we cannot always dis-

tinguish the copula from the predicate in a verb phrase,
as, for example, in
(74) John [runs] at t

We have already seen that Smart is willing to allow that
'to run' has a tenseless form.
5 °Cf.,

But what part of '[runs]

p. 11.

at t' can Smart say is atemporal like the 'is' of 'is
a prime number'?

It cannot, as we have seen, be 'runs'.

Smart's contention that different kinds of tenseless sentences have systematically different sorts of

predicates would also be of little use to proponents of
the second pattern of analysis, for whom 'is' is the only

verb with a tenseless (atemporal) form.

The reason for

this is that it is not difficult to find cases where a

verb phrase appropriate to space-time occupants is morphe-

mically identical to a verb phrase appropriate to mathematical objects, as, for example, in the sentences
( 75 )

The number of persons smoking at t
[is] 4

(7) 2 plus 2 [isj 4

(76) John's decision to leave [is] irrational

(77) Tr Cis] irrational
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It thus appeaps difficult to specify which predicates

are appropriate to which kinds of objects.

There are, by the way, passages from Smart which

suggest that he really does not think that modifiers
like 'at t',

cates.

'before t', etc., should be parts of predi-

Instead, he appears to suggest that these phrases

should be appended to subject- phrases . where the objects

being denoted are four-dimensional time-slices of an
individual's entire space-time history.

In the next

section I will examine this view in some detail.
It is worth mentioning that there are, in the

literature, at least two additional suggestions for

defining tenseless verbs in terms of tensed verbs.

They

pose no special problems, however, and, like omnitemporal
verbs, incorporate the semantical defects of the tensed

verbs in the definientia.

The first of these suggestions

is to take the tenseless 'is', for example, as equiva-

lent to the tensed 'is and always has been and always
will be

'.

51

C4
7 C. J. F. Williams (in [W$]) mistakenly attributes this
definition to Prior. In any case, he seems to endorse

it himself.

The second kind of 'tenseless' verb appears to be

just a special case of omnitemporal verbs, and was
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suggested by Goodman.

^In

Such verbs are defined as con-

[G133, p. 367.

.junctions of their present, past, and future-tense forms.

We get these verbs whenever we define a verb as the

negation of an omnitemporal verb.

Goodman's example,

from the Calculus of Individuals (changing the symbolism
slightly) is 'abb' (i.e., a [is discrete from] b), de-

fined as '~aOb' (i.e., a [overlaps] b).
'aOb'

=df 'a overlapped b or
a will overlap b'

Obviously, since
a overlaps b

or

'aDb* is

~(a overlapped b
overlap b j

or

a overlaps b

or

a will

and by DeMorgan's rules
[~(a overlapped b)
will overlap b)]

&

~(a overlaps b)

&

~(a

and, presumably, by a tacit application of the principle

that both tensed and tenseless forms of a verb may be

analogously defined, 'aDb' is
(a was discrete from b & a is discrete from
b & a will be discrete from b)

Actually, this tacit principle, which seems to be

required to get Goodman's results, is false.

As tense

logic has made clear, it matters considerably where we
place a negation sign in a past or future-tense expression.

Taking only the past-tense case, in English, the
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unformalized 'John did not attend school', for example,
is ambiguous between 'it was not the case (at some time t)

that John attends school' and 'it never was the case that

John attends school'#

These would be formalized, respec-

tively, by the Prior-type expressions 'P~(p)' and '~P(p)',

where 'P(p)' is 'it was the case that p'

,

and where

'p'

is a schematic letter replaceable by present-tense sen-

tences*
'~P(p)'

The latter of these two formulae

— corresponds

— that

is,

formally to the tensed '~(a over-

lapped b)', which, if re-parsed into that form, would
read inelegantly as 'it is (now) not the case that it
was the case that a overlaps b'
b).

(i.e., a never overlapped

But to make Goodman’s trick work, the tilde in

'~(a overlapped b)' must, as it were, be inside the

parentheses (as part of the verb), if we want to end
up with 'a was discrete from b'.

It is consistent with

the past-tense 'a was discrete from b' that a overlapped
b at some other time in the past*

But *~(a overlapped

b)' means 'a never overlapped b', or, in other words,
'a was always discrete from b'.
Y/e

can make this more perspicuous as follows.

It

is often useful in Prior's systems to define 'P(p)' as

'~H~(p)', where ’H(p)' is 'it has always been the case
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that p' • 53

Thus '~H~(p)' reads 'it is not the case that

^Sometimes 'H(p)' is defined as '~P~(p)'.
it has always been the case that it is not the case that

P'» or more intuitively,

'it has not always been the case

that it is not the case that
case that p'.
'P(aDb)'.

— that

is,

'it was the

Goodman wants to get from '~P(aOb)' to

But if anything is to get us to 'P(aDb)' it

is likely to be 'P-(aOb)'.
is equivalent to

'H~(aOb)'.

p'

'

'~P(aOb)', on the other hand,

—H~(aOb)',

or by double negation,

This problem also afflicts the future-tense

case, as can be seen by adjusting the formalism slightly,

substituting the future-tense operator
the case that.*.) for 'P' and *G'

'F'

(it will be

(it always will be the

case that...) for 'H'.

Thus it appears that Goodman cannot sustain the

view that some tenseless verbs may be defined as a conjunction of their simple-tensed forms, where the conjunction is derived in the manner explained above.

Without the suspicious principle that tensed and tenseless forms of a verb may be analogously defined, what
we can infer from

[~(a overlapped b) &
~(a will overlap b)]

~(a overlaps b)

&

is
(a was always discrete from b & a is discrete
from b & a will always be discrete from b)
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which is actually the first additional kind of tenseless
verb mentioned above.

Thus the special case of omni-

temporal verbs is not a conjunction of simple-tensed

expressions, and the two additional suggestions for

tenseless verbs reduce to one.
We see, then, that in addition to problems with

translating certain kinds of tensed sentences into
tenseless sentences according to the tenseless patterns
of analysis, some rather fundamental questions can be

raised about one of the principal devices used for

de-tensing sentences

— namely,

tenseless verbs.

More-

over, it appears that it may even have been a mistake
to suppose that verbs in bensed sentences are in some

sense temporally informative

,

and that a change in the

temporal content of a verb explains how a string of

phonemes or symbols may in one case be tensed and in
another case be tenseless.

Indeed, we shall see later

that an account placing the burden of tense on tensed

and tenseless verbs is inadequate for languages which
have tensed sentences but whose verbs have no grammatical

inflections

,

and especially for languages which often

do not even use verbs.

Tensed Sentences and Physics
Smart and Quine are prominent among philosophers

10 $

wh.o

hold the view that a tenseless language is properly

used to talk about the objects of modern physical theory,

rather than the objects of ordinary language, which

sire

subject to the vagaries of change and temporal becoming.^
'

'

See Smart: [S10J
[Sll], [S12]
Quine: [Ql], [Q2], [Q3],
and also Earman: [El], Williams: [W4], Wilson: [W?], [V/8 J
,

V/hat

,

these philosophers propose is that we supplant our

ordinary talk about the three-dimensional changing occupants of the world with talk about the four-dimensional

inhabitants of space-time.
Smart, for example, writes
A man or stone or star is commonly regarded
as a three-dimensional object which nevertheless endures through time. This enduring
through time clearly brings a fourth dimension
into the matter, but this fact is obscured by
our ordinary language. In our ordinary way
of talking we stress the three-dimensionality
of bodies, and by our notion of the permanent
in change we conceal the fact that bodies
extend through time. For philosophical reasons,
therefore, it is of interest to discuss a way
of talking which does not make use of the
notion of the permanent in change.
...Instead of talking of things or processes
changing or not changing we can now talk of
one time slice of a four-dimensional entity
being different or not different from some
other time slice. (Note the tenseless participle of the verb ’to be' in the last

sentence •
When we think four-dimensionally therefore, we replace the notions of change and
staying the same by the notions of the similarity and dissimilarity of time slices of
four-dimensional solids. ([Sll], pp. 132-133)
,

One cannot talk about such four-dimensional objects

without specifying a time coordinate, and Smart
seems
to waver between two methods of indicating this
temporal
information.

In fact, his failure to point out that

he employs both methods suggests either that he
saw no

difference between the two, or that he regarded any
such differences as too insignificant to mention.
One way to talk about four-dimensional objects,

Smart suggests, is to add modifiers roughly of the forms
at t

,

before t

'

,

or 'after

t'

to the predicates of

ordinary language, the verbs of which would then all be

considered tenseless (atemporal) .55
55 Cf.,

Thus, objects

[Sll], pp . 134-ff , and the passage auoted from
Smart on p. 11 a bove. Similar positions arc exprcssc VX
A
by Duncan- Jones [D5], and Russell: [R7], [R9J.
.

described by these tenseless sentences would not be said
to be just red or heavy or full, simnliciter.

Instead,

they would be said to be red at (before, after) t,

heavy at (before, after) t, or full at (before, after)
t.

Therefore we might say of the entire space-time

individual, John, that he is fat-at-t.

Alternatively, we might ascribe properties to
time- slices

— that

is

,

four-dimensional cross-sections

of space-time individuals.

Thus, instead of saying that

John is fat-at-t, we would say of some time-slice,
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»

that it is fat. 56

Smart appears to advocate

C/L

J For a discussion
of these two styles of tenseless
language (in a somewhat different context), see Wilson:
LW7J, [W8] , and his critic, Prior: [P9].

time slice talk in the passage quoted above

,

and also

in the following representative selection.
...What we express in our ordinary language
representation by saying that the spherical
cricket ball becomes ellipsoidal we express
in our four-dimensional representation by
saying that the three-dimensional cross-section
for t = t, is spherical and that the threedimensional cross-section for t = t* is
ellipsoidal.
([S12J, reprinted in [Gl], p. 164)

Quine also regards a tenseless language as the

appropriate medium for discussing the objects of physics.
...Logical grammar, like modern physics,
is best served by treating time as a dimension
coordinate with the spatial dimensions; treating date, in other words, as just another

determinable on a par with position. Verbs
can then be taken as tenseless. Temporal
predicates, such as the two-place predicate
’is earlier than', belong in the lexicon on
a par merely with predicates of position or
color or anything else. Any temporal details
that we may want to include in a sentence,
in the absence of tensed verbs, we may add
explicitly in the same way that we might add
details of position or color.
A body is thus visualized eternally as a
four-dimensional whole, extending up and down,
north and south, east and west, hence and ago.
A shrinking body is seen as tapered toward
the hence; a growing body is tapered toward
the ago.
We might think of a -physical object... as
simply the whole four-dimensional material
content, however sporadic and heterogeneous,
of some portion of space-time. ([Q3], P* 50;
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•••The space-time view helps one appreciate
that there is no reason why my first and fifth
decades should not, like my head and feet,
count as parts of the same man, however dissimilar. ( [Q2] p. 171)
,

The importance for logic of discussing four-dimen-

sional objects tenselessly is considerable, according to
Quine
...Think how awkward it is, without [a fourdimensional] view, to make sense of applying
a predicate to something that no longer exists;
or to make sense of quantifying over objects
that never coexisted at any one time, and
assembling such objects into sets. ([Qq],

3D

P.

For the most part, Quine seems to endorse time-slice
talk as opposed to talk of entire space-time individuals
with temporally restricted properties.

Thus he urges

that we replace talk of the cat, Tabby, with talk of

Tabby-at-t •

^See

[Q2]

,

r

Quine explains expressions like 'Tabby

p. 174 .

at t' as follows,
...We are to think of t as an epoch of any
desired duration and any desired position
along the time axis. Then where x is a
spatio-temporal object, we can construe 'x
at t' as naming the common part of x and t.
([Q2], p. 172)

reserving complications arising from taking the time
variable as ranging over durationless point-instants
for later in the book.

Smart's failure to distinguish these two approaches
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to discussing four-dimensional objects and their proper-

ties often makes for curious reading.

Immediately after

introducing time-slices in [Sll ], 58 he begins eliminating

—
In the passage quoted on p. 103

tensed verbs in favor of tenseless verbs and temporal
modifiers, without trying to employ singular terms

denoting time-slices.
^ See Smart’s remarks on de-tensing quoted on p. 11.

Shortly thereafter, Smart writes
...In the four-dimensional way of talking,
of course , we must not say even that things
come into existence we replace talk of a
building coming into existence at t by talk
of the earliest time slice of the building
being [the italics indicate tenselessness
at t. ([Sll], p. 133)

—

If Smart is here offering an example or description of

time-slice talk, he is at least very misleading.

In

time-slice talk it is redundant to say that a timeslice i£ [tenseless] at t, since that time-coordinate

must already have been given in order to pick out the

time-slice we are interested in.

To say that the building

comes into existence at t, we need only identify a

certain quadruple of values for the building's (x,y,z,t)
space-time coordinates as one of the extremities of
that building's world-line.
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Another interesting example of Smart's tendency
to slip out of time-slice talk is the following.

Since time is already involved in spacetime, we cannot speak of change in spacetime in any sense other than of some parts
of space-time being different from others.
In this last sentence 'being' is of course
not a true present tense, but is the tenseless 'present' which we get in mathematics....
Instead of saying that a body changes from
being red to being green we should say that
an earlier spatial cross-section of the
(four-dimensional) space-time body is (tenselessly) red and that a later one is (tenselessly) green. Again, it is clearly illegitimate to speak of a body or a signal moving
through space-time. The concept of motion
is now replaced by the notion of the relative inclinations of world-line 3 . Thus in
Figure 7

the particles AB and CD are further away
from one another at t* than they are at
Similarly, instead of saying that the
t,
•
relative motion of the second with respect
to the first is greater at t, than at t A
we say that the inclination of one worldline with respect to the other is greater
at t, than at t A •
([S10J, p. 226)
,
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When he discusses a body changing colors, Smart
is apparently urging time-slice talk, since he suggests

that we talk in terms of the properties of cross-sections
of space-time individuals.

But what Smart does next

is to talk about the world-lines A3 and CD and their

properties and relations at certain times .

But rather

than discussing the properties of two world-lines

(representing two space-time individuals) at different
times, he should be discussing the properties of pairs
of time-slices, or of computed intervals between time-

slices, thus giving the value for the t-variable simply

by indicating which objects are being denoted.
It is not clear to what extent we are entitled to

slip from talk of entire space-time individuals to talk
of time-slices, or conversely, even for our purposes.
I will, in fact, suggest one problem afflicting only

time-slice talk.

But whether or not these two space-

time languages can be regarded as interchangeable for

most purposes, it does seem to be worth noting that
Smart is not very careful in adhering in practice to
the time-slice talk he endorses in most cases.

With respect to eliminating talk of change of

three-dimensional bodies, then, the two views suggested
by scientifically oriented philosophers like Smart and
Quine would be something like the following.

While in
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languag© we say that a poker is hot

and.

then

cold, it is more accurate to say that the .poker-at-t
[is] hot, and the poker-at-t*

that t ^ t*.

[is] cold, and of course

Or, rather than saying that the poker-at-t

[is] hot, we might prefer to say that the poker [is]

the object in a specifiable region of space-time which
[is] hot— at— t.

The sense in which the poker does not

change, then, is that it does not acquire or lose

properties.

Different temporal stages (or four-dimen-

sional cross-sections) of the poker (or poker's spacetime worm) have properties that other stages (or cross-

sections) do not have.

and the poker-at-t*

When the poker-at-t [is] hot

[is] cold, it is not the case that

at t' the poker has changed, since the poker-at-t [is]

still hot, or alternatively, the poker [is] still hot-at-t.

This is analogous to saying that a three-dimensional

poker that is hot at one end and cold at the other does
not change.

It is simply hot-at(place) p and cold-at-p'.

Or, the poker-at-p is hot, while the poker-at-p* is

cold.

We do not call this a change in the poker; nor

should we call the analogous situation with space-time
occupants change.

A similar view of the objects of

physics has been urged

— in

a slightly different context

by Donald Williams.
...The 'change* of a leaf's color from day
to day is of the same denomination as its

Ill

'change* from inch to inch of its surface.
reprinted in [Gl], p. 116)

(WO,

Since a significant group of philosophers has found

time-slice talk attractive, perhaps it would have been

worthwhile to note earlier that the first pattern of
analysis, which appears to employ temporally restricted

predicates, might have been given an additional formulation.

That is, instead of analyzing
(18) John will be (is now, has been) fat

as
(17) (Et)(t [is] later than (simultaneous with
earlier than)
& John [is] fat at t)

some philosophers might have preferred to analyze (18) as
(17’) (Et)(t [is] later than (simultaneous with,
earlier than)
& John-at-t [is] fat)
As the first pattern of analysis was originally

presented, however, it was left open what kind of objects

certain of the singular terms in these schemata

— namely,

those ordinarily thought to denote three-dimensional

physical objects

— were

to refer to.

For the sake of

generality, this was just as well, since some of the

philosophers who like to analyze tensed sentences
according to the first pattern of analysis do not suggest
that objects other than three-dimensional objects are

being denoted by these singular terms in the derived
tenseless sentences.

Moreover, any criticisms pre-
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viously lodged against the first pattern of analysis
could also have been directed against this additional

form of that analysis.
And as far as I can see, only one additional
puzzle worth noting would. have arisen had we taken the

first pattern of analysis to be a means for re-expressing

tensed sentences into time— slice sentences.

This nuzzle

concerns the sense of the predicates said to be true of
time-slices. 60 Put very simply, it is not clear how
Geach raises this problem in [Gil].
some predicates generally held to be true of three-

dimensional changing individuals can be true cf timeslices.

Although we can perhaps understand how an entire

space-time individual, Fido, can be said to bark-at-t
or be hungry-at-t, it is not at all clear what it means
to say that the time-slice Fido-at-t barks or is hungry .

Time slices simply do not bark or get hungry; dogs do,

however.

And not even proponents of time-slice talk

maintain that a dog is the same thing as a dog-slice.
Perhaps what is needed for time-slice talk is a
special kind of predicate.

Thus while dogs bark, it

might be argued that dog-slices bark*, where 'bark*'
is a special kind of slice-predicate .

How we are to

understand such predicates is a matter requiring some
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explanation.

In any case, it is not obvious that an

insuperable difficulty has been posed here for proponents
of time— slice talk, although this problem would seem to

warrant their attention.
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CHAPTER IV
THE TRUTH-CONDITIONS OF TENSED SENTENCES

Truth-Conditions and Truth-Value Instability
Having examined the major distinctions between

tensed and tenseless sentences, and having furthermore

considered the defects of these distinctions,

I shall

now offer what I regard as a satisfactory account of
tensed and tenseless sentences.

This account is, I

think, in the spirit of most authors who have tried to

explain what such sentences are.

Moreover it is con-

sistent with the intuitions concerning tensed sentences

discussed in Chapter I, and also avoids the problems of
the views already considered.

Keeping in mind, then, that

I

am still considering

only declarative sentence-events (or tokens) to be
sentences, I shall say that a sentence S is tensed if

and only if it is necessary that for any two moments
of time M and M* (where M / M‘

)

replicas of S produced

at those times have different truth-conditions.
cT
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1

The modality in this definition is perhaps best understood as logical necessity, where, by It rs logically
necessary that p' I mean that p is either a substitution
instance of a logical theorem or is inferred from such
by the use of explicit definitions for its non-logical
?

expressions
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To see that it is necessary that temporally

separated replicas of a tensed sentence have different
truth-conditions, we need definitions of the truth-

conditions for the major forms of tensed sentences.
There are no doubt a variety of ways in which we might
state the truth-conditions of tensed sentences, but I

suspect that they would not differ significantly from
the following.
(a) A past-tense sentence 'S was 9' (or *S
cpd') [is] true if and only if at some
time prior to the time of its production
S [is] 9 (or S [is] cping).

(b) A present-tense sentence 'S is cp (or 'S
is cping') [is] true if and only if S [is]
9 (or S [is] 9ing) at the time of its
*

production.
(c) A future-tense sentence 'S will be 9'
(or '3 will 9* ) [is] true if and only if
at some time later than the time of its
production S [is] 9 (or S [is] cping)#

Here

,

the device of bracketing verbs does not indi-

Rather, it indi-

cate that those verbs are tenseless.

cates that the truth-conditions of the simple sentence

formed in part by that verb are not relativized to the
We may thus retain

time of production of that sentence.

bracketing as a handy mnemonic device

,

without embracing

the view that verbs are tensed or tenseless.

Schemata (a), (b), and (c) obviously do not cover
all the important forms of simple-tensed sentences.
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Where past, present, or future-tensed, sentences contain

adverbial clauses roughly of the form 'at-t', we can
make minor adjustments in the above schemata.
just the past-tense case

,

To take

we could say

(d) A past-tense sentence 'S was cp at t*
(or *S cpd at t') [is] true if and only
if t [is] some time prior to the time
of its production and S [is] cp at t
(or S [is] cping at t).

Obvious modifications of (d) would be required if, in-

stead of the modifier 'at
t*.

t*

,

we had used 'before (after)

For example,
(e) A future-tense sentence 'S will be cp
after t' (or 'S will cp after t') [is]
true if and only if at some time later

than the time of its production and also
later than t, S [is] cp (or S [is] cping).
The rather mundane respect, then, in which a tensed

sentence changes truth-conditions from moment to moment

may be put crudely by saying that the temporal scope
of the sentence changes from moment to moment.

Another

way of putting this would be to say that what counts
as the time of (or prior to or later than the time of)
a sentence s production at M is not what counts as the
'

time of (or prior to or later than the time of) produc-

tion of a replica of that sentence at

M*

•

Thus, for

example, where M and M' are two moments such that M
is earlier than M*

,

past-tense sentence

the truth-conditions at M of the
'S cpd'

are not identical with the
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truth-conditions of that sentence at M'
of time in which S can

varies from M to H'.
is at M, then "S

cpd'

cp

,

since the period

for the sentence to be true

In fact, if the only time S

cps

would be false at M, though true

at M'

In some cases, therefore, not only the truth-

conditions but the truth- value of replicas of a tensed
sentence S will differ*

As in the above case, for

example, if, upon uttering *S

cpd',

there is no time

prior to the time of utterance when S
sentence will be false*

cps,

then the

At some later time, however,

a replica of that sentence will be true, if in the period

of time preceding the production of that replica, S

And if S never

cps,

then 'S

cpd'

cps.

can have only false re-

plicas, even though its truth-conditions change with

each successive replication.
The change in a tensed sentence's truth-condi-

tions, then, is rather subtle in most cases.

non-simultaneous replicas of

'S cpd'

regardless of when S actually

period of time in which S must

cps

cp

If two

are produced, then

(if S

cps

at all), the

for the first replica

to be true cannot be identical with the period of time

in which S must

cp

for the later replica to be true.

If

the second replica is produced, say, ten minutes after

the first, then the truth-conditions of that replica
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are such that if S

(and does not

cp

cps

within that period of ten minutes

at any other time), the replica will be

true, whereas the truth-conditions of the first replica
are such that that replica will not be true if S's only

case of cping occurs within those ten minutes.

There may, of course, be non-temporal respects in

which the truth-conditions of two sentence-replicas
differ.

If the sentence contains, say, a spatial in-

dexical like ’here' or the personal pronoun 'I',

replicas of the sentences produced at two different
places or by two different persons will have different

truth-conditions.

If these replicas are further pro-

duced at different times and are tensed, there must then
be another respect in which the truth-conditions differ.

Thus the truth-conditions of
(78) The murder took place here
(79) I lost my shoe

can vary from place to place (in the first case) and

from person to person (in the second).

But what indi-

cates that these sentences are tensed is that their

truth-conditions must change from moment to moment even
if they were always produced, respectively, at the same

location and by the same person.
We see, then, that this view of tensed sentences

accounts for (what we have been misleadingly calling)
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the truth-value instability of tensed sentences, without

committing the mistake of taking all tensed sentences to
have unstable truth- values.

Change of Sense and the Intricacies of Tensed Discourse
This view of tensed sentences also avoids the error
of supposing that all non-simultaneous replicas of a

tensed sentence differ in sense or advance different
claims, and thus does not need to rely on change of
sense to explain how replicas of tensed sentences change

in truth- value.

Although the truth-conditions of, say,

the past-tense 'S

are such that S must

<pd*

cp

prior to

its production for the sentence to be true, it is not

being claimed that

'S

cpd'

means 'S

cps

(tensed or tense-

less) prior to t (the time of production)', and hence

that temporally separated replicas of

different claims.

'S

cpd

'

make

This, of course, seems compatible

with the facts of ordinary discourse.
crossed the Rubicon'

,

I

If you say 'Caesar

can agree with you at a later

time by also saying 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon'.

Similarly if you say 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' and
I disagree, I can say 'It is not the case that Caesar

crossed the Rubicon' at some later time and still
contradict you.
There is a sense, then, in which non-simultaneous
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replicas of a tensed sentence can advance the same claim,
even though they do not have the same truth-conditions,
and, moreover, there is a sense in which non-simultaneous

tensed sentences can advance contradictory claims.

It

would be useful, of course, to get clear on what, exactly,
is meant in this case by 'same claim'.

But this would

require elaborating a reasonably comprehensive theory
of meaning, which would exceed the scope of this thesis.

But even in the absence of a theory of meaning, it should
not be difficult to appreciate that there is an important sense in which replicas of a tensed sentence do

make the same claim; we can, after all, agree with each

other at different times

— that

is, in some sense we can

say the same thing (and not just utter the same string
of phonemes)

— by

saying, for example,

'Caesar crossed

the Rubicon'
It should also be pointed out that not only can
we make the same claim with non-simultaneous replicas

of a tensed sentence S, but we can also make the same

claim (probably in the same sense of 'same claim') with
tensed counterparts of S .

That is

,

the claim made by
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This is discussed by Buridan: [B5], and in considerable
detail by Sellars: [S$].
'Caesar crossed the Rubicon', after Caesar had traversed
the river, is the same claim made by 'Caesar will cross
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fch.e

Rubicon

,

said before bhab bime.

same claim can be made by

House’,

'

Similarly, bhe

John will visib bhe Whibe

'John is visibing bhe Whibe House', and 'John

visibed bhe Whibe House', said, respecbively

,

before,

during and afber John's visibing bhe Whibe House.
Tensed discourse has addibional inberesbing
feabures, some of which may seem rabher peculiar.

For

bhe mosb parb, however, bhese feabures are familiar

and should nob be explained away as aberranb resulbs
of an incorrecb view of bhis mode of language.

One in-

beresbing sibuabion bhab may arise in speaking a bensed
language is bhab ab M (for example) you can say

'S

cpd'

and be wrong, since ab bhab bime S may nob yeb have

cpd.

Bub ab some laber bime I can agree wibh you and say 'S
cpd*

and bhis senbence replica can be brue, provided bhab

S had

cpd

by bhen.

This phenomenon is easily explained by nobing bhab

albhough bhe bwo senbence replicas make bhe same claim,
bhe earlier replica had differenb brubh-condibions from

bhe laber one.

If bhey had had bhe same brubh-condi-

bions, bhey would nob only have had bhe same sense or

meaning, bub bhe same brubh- value.
Some obher inberesbing cases can be found in bhe

sophisms of John Buridan. 0 ^
63 See [B51.

In one sophism Buridan
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thinks that he can establish that a present-tense sentence can be true at a time during which what is occurcj±

ring is described by the sentence’s contradictory,

^See

[B5], pp. 171-172.

Suppose that at moment M you say 'Socrates is not sitting'
and that Socrates happens to be sitting at H, so that
the sentence you utter is false.
at a later moment M' I

— in

Suppose, however, that

an effort to disagree

— say

'Socrates is sitting' and that at that time it so happens

that Socrates is no longer sitting.

Since my utterance

of 'Socrates is sitting' at M' is the contradictory of
a false sentence, it must be true, even though Socrates

is not sitting at M'

Another such puzzle is posed by Buridan as follows
(we should read 'proposition' as 'sentence', since Buridan

is clearly concerned with the latter).

...If I say 'Socrates is running', you do
not know what proposition I shall say until
So you do not know how to
I have spoken.
contradict me until I have spoken, and then
you cannot contradict me , because the time
is not the same, which is required for the
contradiction. Indeed, if you say, wishing
to contradict me, that Socrates is not running,
it may be that I spoke the truth and that you
also' speak the truth, since when I spoke, he
was running, and when you spoke, he was not
running. But a true proposition never contradicts a true one. ([B5], PP* 170-171)

Buridan resolves this last problem by claiming that the
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verb in the later sentence is to be taken as referring
to (or connoting, perhaps) the same time as the verb

in the first sentence, and that the intent [intentionem]
of the two sentences is the same.

What is more interesting, perhaps, is that Buridan

regards the second, present-tense sentence as the proper

response in both these cases.

This accounts, I think,

for the fatal artificiality of his examples.

If, in the

second case, I want to contradict your earlier remark,
'Socrates is running', it is not at all clear that the

way to do this is to utter the present-tense sentence,
'Socrates is not running'.

In fact, in straightforward

conversational contexts of the sort Buridan is concerned
with, ' the present-tense 'Socrates is not running' is

^Ignoring, that is, cases (say) of lying or pedagogical
utterances of sentences (e.g., 'Consider the sentence
"Socrates is not running"').

appropriate only when the utterer knows or believes that

Socrates is not running at the time of utterance.
I

If

knew or believed that Socrates was not running at the

time of utterance, the way to disagree with your pre-

vious utterance of 'Socrates is running' would have been
to say

— in

the past-tense

[when you said that]'.

— 'But

Socrates was not running

Similarly for the first case:

if at M' I knew or believed that Socrates was no longer
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sitting, the way to contradict your previous utterance
of

*

Socrates is not sitting’ would have been to say,

'But Socrates was sitting [when you said that]'.

The moral of all this seems to be that the way to

contradict a sentence S in ordinary tensed discourse

may not be to utter a sentence which is formally equivalent to ~S.

It appears, instead, that sometimes we must

change tense to agree or disagree.

Buridan is plainly

wrong, then, in denying that it is proper in ordinary

language to change tense to contradict earlier utterances.
DD
C. (L

See [B5], p. 171.

Moreover, it is just this kind of interesting feature
of ordinary tensed discourse that some of the philoso-

phers discussed in previous chapters want to eliminate
in a revisionary tenseless language.
The verbal gymnastics required for speaking care-

fully in a tensed language do not end here.

For centuries

philosophers have tried to understand what the present
(or now ) is, and the puzzles they offer carry over into

everyday uses of the present-tense.^

The sophisms just

^See, for example, Augustine:

[A6]. Buridan: [B53i Gale:
[P6j, [P7], Russell: [R8],
Prior:
[Gl], [G4J, [G8], [G10J,
[R9J, Sellars: [S3], Thalberg: [T2].

cited from Buridan, notably, also involve problems with
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the present-tense*

But an example of the paradigm case

concerning perplexities with the present is the case
in which we are at a concert and you ask me 'What is now
playing?'

•

I have,

answering you.

I

presumably, several options in

might say (truly), 'The Emperor Con-

certo is now playing'

,

or more precisely, 'The second

movement of the Emperor Concerto is now playing'

,

or

more precisely still, 'The first eighth-note in measure

47 of the second movement of the Emperor Concerto is
playing'.

nov;

The problem, of course, with this last answer

is that as long as we choose to be so precise about the

extent of the present, that answer appears to be false

before it is completely uttered, since by the time the

answer is given, another note is being played.
Analogous situations arise quite often in ordinary
discourse.

When we are asked 'What are you thinking?',

do we correctly answer (in the past-tense, presumably)

by reporting what we were thinking when the question
was posed, or do we mention what we are thinking while
we mention it?

If the former, then we are in the

apparently paradoxical position of answering a question
about our present activities by describing past activities.

If the latter, then we might run into a problem

similar to that encountered in trying to say that a

particular note of the Emperor Concerto is now playing,

126

since we might have one thought at the beginning of our

answer and another at the end#
We needn't dwell any longer, here, on the intri-

cacies of speaking a tensed language.

Instead, let us

continue considering which sentences are tensed on the

account just given.

Something Old, Something New
Let us first examine some sentences that proved

troublesome for some of the previously considered
accounts of tensed sentences.

To begin with, hybrid

sentences, having both tensed and tenseless components,
are tensed on the present (no pun intended) view.

Sentences such as
(40) John was a married bachelor
are unmarried
(80) John was fat

or

&

bachelors

7 is a prime number

are tensed, since the truth-conditions of the tensed

component , and hence of the entire sentence

from moment to moment.

,

must change

(80), for example, is true if

and only if either at some time prior to its production

John is fat, or 7 is a prime number.

And since what

counts as the time prior to the time of production at
one moment is not identical with the period of time

counting as the time prior to the time of production
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at another moment, the truth-conditions of (80) must

change in the same (perhaps minuscule) way as do those
of other tensed sentences.
We can also preserve, on this view, the distinc-

tion between tensed and tenseless analytic sentences.
There are, in other words, certain sentences that appear
to be analytic and that also appear to exhibit the

instability of truth-conditions characteristic of tensed
sentences.

Consider
(44) John was a married bachelor
(81) Nobody is squaring the circle
(4^) Nobody has squared the circle

Even though their truth- values remain invariant through
time, the truth-conditions of these sentences vary in
the same way as do the truth-conditions of the more

ordinary tensed sentences discussed above

•

With respect

to (44), the time in which John must be a married bache-

lor for (44) to be true must change with each successive
replication.

If (44) is to be true at all, John must

be a married bachelor prior to the time of production

of (44), and, as is the case with ordinary tensed sen-

tences, this time changes with each moment of utterance.
But, of course, John can never be a married bachelor;

thus (44) will be false whenever produced.
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Similarly

,

if (81) is to be true, there cannot be

anyone squaring the circle at the time of -its production,
and this time, and hence the truth-conditions of (81),
must change from moment to moment.

And, of course, (81)

will always be true, since nobody will ever square the

circle when a replica of (81) is produced.
It is important to distinguish sentences like (81)

and

(4-5)

from their tenseless modal variants, like
(82) Nobody can square the circle

Our language is rich enough so that we can indicate not

only that something failed to happen, or is failing to
happen, but that it cannot happen at all, and we can
make these distinctions both with respecc to things

which can happen and also to those which cannot.
But

(4-5)

,

(81) and (82), of course, are all true,

and it is tempting to say that

because (82) is true.

(4-5)

and (81) are true

But this is rather misleading,

since it might be taken to suggest that all three sen-

tences have the same truth-conditions.

However (81)

is true because nobody is squaring the circle while it

is produced, just as
(6) Mary is frowning

is true if and only if Mary is frowning while it is

produced.

Of course the reason why nobody is squaring

the circle while a replica of (81) is produced is that
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nobody can do so.

But this does not indicate that (81)

and (82) have the same truth-conditions.

After all,

(8$) Nobody has seen a live trilobite
(84) Nobody is seeing a live trilobite

are both true, given the facts of Paleontology.

In fact,

these two sentences are true because
(85) The extinction of trilobites antedates
man's appearance on earth

is true, just as (45) and (81) are true because (82) is

true.

Yet we would not say that (85)-(85) all have the

same truth-conditions, even though in this one sense

they are true for the same reason.

Nor, presumably,

would we make the analogous claim with respect to (45),
(81) and (82).

Another class of sentences, some members of which
were problematical on earlier accounts, is the class of

sentences in the future perfect tense.

All sentences

in this class count as tensed on the view being considered.

A rough schema giving the truth-conditions

for sentences in the future perfect is the following.
(f) A future perfect tense sentence 'S will
have <pd (before, by t)' [is] true if and
only if prior to some time after the time
of its production, S [cps] (before, by t).

Obviously, what counts as the period of time after the
time of the sentence's production must change from

moment to moment, as it does in the case of an ordinary

130

future-tense sentence.

Thus the truth-conditions of a

future perfect tense sentence must change slightly

with each successive moment, although the change is
not significant enough to alter the truth-value of the

sentence in most cases.

Omnitemporal sentences also count as tensed on
this view.

Since each disjunct in
(5^) S

cpd

or

Sis

coing

or

S will

<p

is a tensed sentence, the truth-conditions of these

components must change from moment to moment.

And since

the truth-conditions of the components of (5*0 must

change, (5^) is likely to be true at different times
(if true at all) in virtue of the truth of different

components, unlike a paradigm tenseless disjunction.
68

Cf., pp. 56ff

This, it seems to me, indicates that the truth-conditions
of the entire sentence change.

But unlike an ordinary

simple tensed sentence, whose changing truth-conditions

determine when it is satisfied, the changing truth-

conditions of an omnitemporal sentence determine how
it is satisfied at the time of its production.

true if and only if S

cps

(3^) is

at the time of production, or

at some time prior to or later than the time of produc-

tion.

And since for each successive replica of (54),
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different periods of tine will be the time of production
and the times prior to and later than that, the periods
of time in which what the sentence reports must occur

for the sentence to be true must change from moment to

moment
But the manner in which a sentence like
(53)

[is] earlier than E^

earlier than
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E

2

E-,

3

is satisfied does not depend on when , relative to the time

of its production in general, what it reports occurs.

The temporal location of E^, E^, and E^ relative to the

time of production of (55) does not determine how or

whether (55) and its replicas are satisfied.
It should also be illuminating to consider whether

sentences in fictional contexts are tensed.
to have two options.

We seem

On one hand we might say that

fictional sentences are tenseless, since their truth-

conditions do not change.

A character in a novel might

remark
(86) George drowned in Lake Michigan

and this sentence will be 'true' in the novel if and

only if George .drowns in Lake Michigan at some earlier
point in the story.

But (86) does not have truth-condi-

tions that change with time, since its 'truth' is de-

termined by the story and not by its relation to any-
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thing that occurs in time (except, of course, the writing
of the novel).

Alternatively, and I think more plausibly, we might
say that fictional objects undergo fictional change,

which is modeled after 'real' change (that is, as described in ordinary language rather than in a four-dimensional language), and that 'tensed* sentences like
(86), reporting fictional occurrences, must be dis-

tinguished from

'

tenseless

'

fictional sentences like

(87) The hero of this tale is George

said in the course of a narrative.
one might argue

,

Sentences like (86),

must always be understood from the per-

spective of the narrative present , to borrow a phrase

from some literary critics.

This is true even of fic-

tional sentences in which the (grammatical) presenttense seems to be used to indicate fictional past events,
as in
(88)

...and then John hits Bill

We might bring these cases more clearly into focus

by considering the following situation.
in a novel

,

Suppose that,

John and Bill engage in mortal combat and

that both perish.

Suppose, moreover, that this event

was described in the previous chapter, and that we are

now 'viewing' a later series of events.
reminds us

If the narrator
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(89) John hit Bill

in the course of his narration in this
chapter, his
sentence would be 'true'. However if
he had mistakenly
written
(90) John will hit Bill

his sentence would have been 'false'.

Moreover had the

narrator written (89) too early in the story
(with respect to the narrative present),
(89) would have been
’false'.

value

,

The point here is not that (89) changes

•

truth*

but that it is variable in a way crucially
analo-

gous to the classic tensed sentences discussed
earlier.
In fictional time, a sentence may be uttered, say,
too
soon, just as in ’real' rime.

true

(89), for example, is

in uhe story if and only if at some time prior

to the time of its production (relative to the narrative

present), John hits Bill.

And, as the narrative present

moves along with the reader, the period of fictional
time in which John must hit Bill for a replica of
(89)
(91)
to be 'true' keeps changing.

Sentences in further sorts of literary contexts
also warrant examination at this point.

In non-fiction

we frequently encounter grammatically tensed locutions

such as
In an earlier (a later) chapter we
demonstrated (will demonstrate) that...
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Do such locutions form tensed sentences?

For reasons

I shall offer below, I am inclined to think this is

somewhat of a toss-up.
On one hand we might argue that both literary

fiction and literary non-fiction presuppose a narrative
present, from the ’temporal' perspective of which we
are to understand sentences in literary contexts.

some works of fiction, such as Conrad's ITostromo

,

In
the

narrative present skips back and forth over the fictional
time series in which the story occurs.

Once we ascer-

tain where (or when , perhaps) the narrative present is
at a certain point in the book* we understand how to

construe the narration.

This periodic shifting of

temporal perspective within a novel can, in skillful
hands, be a powerful and exciting literary device.

Non-

fiction rarely presents such difficulties (or excitement).

In these more 'temporally' simplified situations

we might take a locution such as (91) to mean
(92) In a chapter (numerically) preceding
the one now being produced
we demonstrated (will demon-

strate) that...
• « •

This analysis would not be undermined, moreover, if the

chapters were either written or read in an order distinct

from their order in the book.

Against these considerations, it might be urged
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that an interpretation of at least non-fictional sentences

from the perspective of the narrative present makes certain familiar pedagogical locutions impossible to understand,

For example, we frequently encounter
(93) In a later .chapter we have demonstrated

that .

.

(said, for example, in the introduction to a book), the

grammatical past-tense of which would be inappropriate

from the point of view of the narrative present.

Thus,

given the proper contexts, both (93) and
(94) In a later chapter we will demonstrate

that •

•

are acceptable locutions.

Perhaps, then, a more plausible reading than (92)
of expressions like (91) would be
(95) In a chapter (numerically) preceding
(following) this chapter there is a
demonstration that...

where the indexical 'this' is to be understood as being
’temporally’ uninformative

— that

is,

'this chapter' is

not to be understood as meaning something like 'the

chapter now being read'
69
Another interesting case is the newspaper headline.

k^See Chapter III, pp. 86-87*
A sentence like
(67) Jet fighter crashes
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occurring as a headline, should probably be understood
as a past-tense sentence.

Although it does not have a

grammatically past-tense inflected verb, it seems
plausible that this verb inflection is unnecessary,

given the context in which (67) appears.

And, like

other more grammatically orthodox past-tense sentences,
(67) is true if and only if at some time in the period

of time preceding its production, a jet fighter crashes.

Headlines typically dispense with grammatical verb

inflections other than the simple present-tense, and it
is usually clear from context that a past occurrence
is being reported.

In the absence of other temporal

modifiers, (67) would normally be understood as ad-

vancing a claim about what previously happened to a jet
fighter.

Similarly,
(96) Nixon confers with Agnew

would also be understood as a past-tense sentence.
Future-tense headlines usually retain the infinitive
form of a verb, as, for example, in
(97) Nixon to confer with Agnew

if a straightforward future- tense sentence is not used.

The texts of newspaper stories are usually more

grammatically conventional than headlines, and employ
past-inflected verbs for past-tense sentences, and

future-inflected verbs for future tensed sentences.
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Nevertheless, it appears that if Mayo's position con-

cerning the tenselessness of (67) was accurately described in Chapter III, then Mayo was wrong in supposing
that sentences like (67) and (96) are tenseless, simply

because their verbs were deprived of their date-marking
function.

Or, put more generously (since it is not

clear that verbs date at all), sentences like (67) and
(96) are not tenseless just because their verbs are not

inflected in certain ways.
It seem3, then, that the tense of a simple tensed

sentence need not be identical with the grammatical tense
70
when
of its verb. We had a hint of this in Chapter II
7 °Cf., p.

64-.

we considered
(60) Next week I am speaking to the board of

trustees
in which the adverbial phrase 'next week' renders a future-

tensed verb unnecessary.
Having thus liberated ourselves from the fairly
traditional prejudice that the tense of a simple tensed
sentence is identical with the tense of its verb, we
are in a position to consider tensed sentences in

languages other than English, and more interesting
still, we are in a position to consider whether a

tensed sentence must even have an inflected verb at all.
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Tensed Sentences and Natural Languages
Once we see that truth-conditions rather than verb

inflections determine whether a sentence is tensed, it
seems likely that sentences in languages without grammatical tense inflections might nevertheless be semantically
tensed.
We can, I think, ignore complications introduced

by the problem of the indeterminacy of translation.

If

we take Quine's problem of radical translation to in-

dicate that no understanding of foreign languages can
be achieved with any security, then there would be little

point in discussing the semantics of sentences in these
languages, since we would presumably have no way of

knowing what the sentences were

.

But I do not think

that the indeterminacy of translation renders general

linguistics useless, although we may not be able to fix
the reference of terms in a manner suitable for careful

philosophical discussions of ontology.
In any case, should the reader regard indeterminacy
as posing insuperable problems for the study of foreign

languages, then this section should perhaps be passed
over.

But it should be recalled that indeterminacy

afflicts the mother-tongue as well, with respect not only
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to other speakers, but also with respect to oneself ,

71
r

7T

'See W. V. Quine, 'Ontological Relativity: The Dewey
Lectures 1968' , Journal of Philosophy , LXV, 7 (April 4,
1968), pp. 185-212; M* C. Bradley," How Never to Know What
You Mean', Journal of Philosophy LXVI, 5 (March 15 > 1969),
pp, 119-124; J. M. Thomason, 'Ontological Relativity and
the Inscrutability of Reference', Philosophical Studies ,
22, 4 (June, 1971).
!

,

If one accepts the problems of indeterminacy, then one

accepts not only that there is an important philosophical
sense in which we cannot know what objects speakers of

other languages are securing reference to, but that we
also cannot know what speakers of our language are re-

ferring to, and, moreover, that

— to

a point at least

we cannot even know what we are referring to*

It would

seem, then, that if the reader is satisfied that the

claims I have been advancing about the sense of English

sentences are not undermined by the problems of indeterminacy, then he should take a similar position with

respect to the claims I make below about Chinese sentences.

Even a Quinian should admit, in other words,

that an analysis of the semantics of sentences in

foreign languages is in principle no more (or at least
little more) suspicious than semantical analyses of

sentences in one's own language.
I

noted in the Introduction that Finnish sentences

of
which appear to be about the future and all sentences
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Chinese, for example, are thought by linguists not to
be tensed, since these sentences exhibit no verb in-

flections.'72
'

As a description of ordinary Finnish and

See above, n. 2, p. 2.

Chinese syntax, this claim is correct.

Both English

and Chinese linguists agree that Chinese verbs are not
inflected, although various adverbial modifications can
1

be made to Chinese verb phrases

shall see

— for

,

which account

changes in (semantical) tense.

— as

we

Moreover,

in some Chinese sentences, verbs are entirely dispen-

sable

— that

is, they may be eliminated without changing

the sense of the sentence in which they occurred.
In the Chinese sentences linguists claim are equiva-

lent to the English

'I

went to Peking' and

'I

will go

to Peking', the verb form is the same in each case.

But

sometimes that particular string of morphemes is true
if and only if I go to Peking after uttering it, and

other times it is true if and only if I go to Peking

before uttering it.

Moreover, the Chinese sentence for

'the book is thick' can be expressed with or without

the verb 'to be'.

But either string of morphemes is

true if and only if the book is thick upon producing
it*

It appears, then, that Chinese sentences exhibit
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the kind of variability of truth-conditions that I have

claimed is characteristic of tensed sentences, even
though linguists agree that Chinese lacks the grammatical
features in virtue of which sentences of a language are
said to be (grammatically) tensed.
In most cases it is clear in context what the

(semantic) tense of a Chinese sentence is.

When this

is not so clear, and for emphasis or specificity in

those cases when it is clear, a speaker of Chinese can

usually add a temporal modifier like ’last week', 'afterwards',

'recently',

'in the past',

'soon', or 'currently'

to the sentence, much in the manner of (6?) and (60),

discussed earlier.

Moreover there is a somewhat infre-

quent case in which past— tense is indicated by a particle

that gets tacked on to the end of a sentence and which
is not suffixed to the verb.

Roughly, all this particle

completed action^ it indicates, in
does is indicate
(98)
other words, the temporal mode in which the sentence is
to be understood.

To be more specific, consider the following

phonetic representations of some Chinese sentences.
“

Dzwotyan , Women chi fan (Yesterday, we
ate rice)

Mingtyan, Women chi fan (Tomorrow, we
(99)
v
will eat rice)
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Syntactically, the Chinese sentences have the same con-

struction as their English translations.

The first word

is a temporal modifier, followed by the first person

plural pronoun, verb, and direct object.

But notice

that the only difference between the past-tense and

future-tense sentences is that they have different adverbs. The remainder of the sentence, and in particular
(99)
the verb, is the same in each case.
If we prefaced the kernel sentence of (98) and

with a 'present-tense' adverb like 'today', we

would then have a present-tense sentence.

If we left

off the adverb entirely, however, the kernel sentence

would indicate the habitual action of or our disposition
for eating rice.

Thus, by dropping the temporal adverb

from the past-tense
(100) Dzwotyan, Women he cha (Yesterday, we
drank tea)

we get the disposition sentence
(101) Women he cha (We drink tea)

Interrogative Sentences
In the Introduction I observed that philosophers

interested in tensed sentences have really been interested only in declarative sentences.

Linguists, on the

other hand, would not balk at calling interrogatives
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with inflected verbs tensed (if, that is, they would not

balk at calling sentences, rather than verbs, tensed in
the first place).

The present account of tensed sen-

tences reflects the philosopher's preference for declaratives; since interrogatives do not have truth-conditions,

they of course do not count as tensed.

Perhaps, though, there is a sense in which in-

terrogatives may be regarded as semantically tensed.
We can note, first of all, that many interrogatives may

be transformed into a corresponding declarative.

Thus

'Will John visit us tomorrow?' becomes 'John will visit

us tomorrow', and 'Did Mary wash her face?' becomes

either 'Mary did wash her face' or 'Mary washed her face'.
Thus we might want to say that an interrogative

sentence S is tensed if and only if S has a declarative

counterpart

£>'

and S' is tensed.

The difficulty with this position, however, is

that some interrogatives do not have obvious declarative counterparts, although they seem no less tensed

than

'

Will John visit us tomorrow?'.

is John?' would seem to have

part.

For example, 'How

'John is how' as a counter-

Similarly, 'What did you say?' and 'Why did John

beat the butler?' do not seem to have counterparts.
previously
Yet these questions seem as tensed as those

mentioned.

Perhaps, though, we can extend the notion of
•declarative counterpart' so that questions like 'How
is John?' can be included in the class of tensed in-

terrogative s •

Thus we might say that the counterpart

of 'How is John?' would be a schema of the form 'John
is ...

1

,

where the space would be filled in by some

phrase describing John.

Similarly the counterpart

oo

'Why did John beat the butler?' would have the tensed

form 'John beat the butler...’, where, again, the space

would be filled in by the appropriate phrase.
We can thus specify the form of some declarative

counterparts without specifying, exactly, what these
counterparts, in general, would be.

I-ioreover

enough

the counterof the original interrogative is retained in

interrogatives
part to allow us to distinguish most tensed
'Are you
like 'How is John?' from interrogatives like

date on
late for dinner after t?' and "Who is John's
as the sorus
1/7/67?', which we might try to think of
tenseless language.
of questions one asks in a revisionary
would be, respecThe counterparts of these questions

tively,

sentence

the
'You are late for dinner after t', and
schema*.-'

John's date on 1/7/67 is...’.

And

are easily distinguishof course tensed interrogatives
all bachelors unable from interrogatives like 'Are

married?' and "Is red a color?'.
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The above remarks are intended merely to suggest

how we might go about including interrogatives in the
class of tensed sentences, should we regard this in-

clusion as important in the first place.

I suspect

that in order to carry the above analysis any further
it would be necessary to present a rather thorough

analysis of the semantics of interrogatives.

While the

analysis of interrogatives may prove interesting and

perhaps valuable, this area of research is largely unexplored.

And any attempt here to present a suffi-

ciently complete semantics for interrogatives would
no doubt exceed the scope of this dissertation.
In any case it does not seem all that pressing
to deal with interrogatives, since if the above sugges-

tions for classifying such expressions are on the right
track, a distinction between tensed and tenseless in—

terrogatives seems to require having already distinguished

tensed from tenseless declaratives.

And it is the class

philosoof declarative sentences, after all, in which

phers concerned with the tensed/tenseless distinction
have been interested.
sentences
Thus far, I have not considered whether

other than declaratives and interrogatives

imperatives and performatives
as tensed or tenseless.

— deserve

for example,

to be classified

Offhand, it would not seem so.
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Granted, imperatives have a kind of future force

,

since

one cannot be commanded to do something in time that

has already elapsed, and performatives have a kind of

present force.

But in neither case do we seem to have

the sorts of contrasts that we can find in the class of

interrogatives
John

cp?

*

— that

'Will John

,

a color?'.

is, contrasts analogous to 'Did
cp?',

'Is John cping?', and 'Is red

It is difficult to imagine, for example,

what a tenseless imperative would be, as opposed to a
1
standard imperative like 'Do such-and-such

.

'

Thus,

while imperatives and performatives are certainly worth

examining in other contexts, I think they may be passed
over here.
The Tenseless Analyses Reconsidered
I suggested in the last chapter that, assuming

that it made sense to say that verbs have temporal import, it appeared that certain verbs cannot be stripped

entirely of their temporal connotations, or somehow

rendered temporally insignificant.

Thus 'dines

73 See pp. 86-87, PP- 90ff.
(68) (Et)(t is earlier than
dines with Mary at t)

&

John

might not be atemporal.
would
j also observed that some philosophers

m
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construe 'dines' as an omnitemooral verb

— that

is, as

an abbreviation for 'dined or dines or will dine'.
in this case, X noted,

'dines'

But

in (68) is a tensed verb.

Thus if 'dines' in (68) is regarded as an omnitemporal
verb, the second conjunct in (68) must change truth-

conditions with each successive replication, like other

omnitemporal sentences, since the periods of time de-

termining which of the three abbreviated tensed verbs
is appropriate for a given replication of (68) must

change from moment to moment.

At some times the second

conjunct will be satisfied because John dined wi^n

Iiary

at t, and at other times because John will dine with

Mary at t.

And even if there

sire

two different moments

omniat which, say, the future— tense component of the

temporal 'dines' is applicable, the period

Oj.

uime in

virtue of which that component is applicable at one

moment is not identical with the period of time in
applicable
virtue of which the future-tense component is
at another moment.

tensed,
Thus, since the second conjunct in (68) is

tensed as well.
(68) is a hybrid and therefore is

Similar results are obtained if the verb

in

'is'

is earlier
(69) John's dining with Mary

than
is likewise taken to be omnitemporal.

Regardless of
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how we fill in the blank (e.g., with 'now', or a tokenreflexive, or a date), (69) with an omnitemporal 'is'
has truth-conditions which must change from moment to

moment like those of the second conjunct in (73)
But this is not the only respect in which the

schemata for the tenseless patterns of analysis turn
out to be tensed.

^Like

Quine:

75
For example philosophers'^ who

[Q2], Duncan-Jones

:

mam-

[D33.

tain that the blank in schemata like
(17) (Et)(t [is] later than (simultaneous with,
earlier than)
& John [is] fat at t)

(10") The glass’s being full [is] earlier

than
should be replaced by the word ’now’

,

are also providing

awkward tensed analyses of tensed sentences.
To take the simple case, (10"), by substituting
’now’

for the blank, the truth-conditions of (10") turn

out to be the truth-conditions of
(10) The glass was full

full
Both sentences are true if and only if the glass is
at some time prior to the time of the sentence

s

pro-

duction.

And in the case of (17)

»

"the

truth-conditions of

of a
the first conjunct would be the truth-conditions

and thus
tensed sentence, turning (17) into a hybrid,
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into a tensed sentence.

read

Taking the first conjunct to

[is] later than now', this conjunct is true if

't

and only if t is some time later than the time of production.

Thus the truth-conditions of this conjunct

must change from moment to moment as do the truth-con-

ditions of other future-tensed sentences, since the

period of time counting as subsequent to the production
of that conjunct changes with each successive replica-

tion.

Moreover it seems that similar results are obtained
by substituting the token-reflexive expression, 'this
utterance', for the blank in (17) and (10”)«

intimations of this ironic result

m

We had

onapuer Ii,

76 Cf., pp. 71-72.
where it was observed that some substitutions for the

blank in the tenseless analyses did not yield sentences
that were freely repeatable.
It appears, then, that many proponents of tensea means
less analyses were quite unsuccessful in oxfering

the
for re— expressing tensed sentences that avoided

semantic peculiarities of those sentences.

For example,

value instability
we certainly do not avoid the truth—
of
(19) John was fat
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by re-expressing it as either
(102) (Et)(t [is] earlier than now (this
utterance 8c John [is] fat at t)

or
(105) John’s being fat [is] earlier than now
(this utterance)

At a time prior to John’s birth, all three sentences
are false ((102), of course, is false because its second

conjunct is false), although they would be true after
fat John's death.
As I observed in Chapter II, the most promising

means of keeping the tenseless analyses tenseless is
to substitute a date or time-coordinate for the blank
in our schemata.

Many of the philosophers discussed

earlier endorse such a position (if only some of the
time)

^See, for

But it is not clear that they see the adexajnple, pp. 12-15*

vantage of using dates rather than token-reflexives or
'now'
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CONCLUSION
The theory of tensed sentences
offered in the

previous chapter is by no means complete.

I have, for

the most part, avoided discussion
of issues the adequate
treatment of which would have required
lengthy digressions to other thorny matters. Notably,
I have not

examined in any detail the sense in which
replicas of
a tensed sentence, or differently
tensed versions of
a tensed sentence, can advance the
same claim.
But my primary concerns have been, first,
to put
certain well-entrenched prejudices about tensed
sentences
(namely, those concerning free repeatability
and the

temporal import of verbs) in their proper
perspective,
and secondly, to offer what I regard as an
accurate

account of the distinction between tensed and tenseless sentences.

Since distinctions between tensed and

tenseless sentences based on some of these prejudices
have been used to support certain other philosophical
views, it would be interesting to see whether these

other views would survive an analysis of tensed sentences such as I have proposed.

For example, it would

be interesting to see whether a comprehensive tenseless

language can be constructed, given the misgivings ex-

pressed earlier about de-tensing verbs (that is, depriving
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them of temporal import).
In any case, it should be of intrinsic interest

that we can distinguish these two classes of sentences
on the basis of their truth-conditions, and in parti-

cular, that the truth-conditions of tensed sentences
are relativized to the times of their production, while

those of tenseless sentences are not.
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